



**City of Seattle**  
**Office of City Auditor**

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**Evidence-Based Assessment  
Of the City of Seattle's Crime  
Prevention Programs:**  
*What Have We Learned, and What  
Should We Do Next?*

**David Jones, City Auditor**  
**Claudia Gross Shader, Assistant City Auditor**

**September 5, 2012**

# City of Seattle

## Office of City Auditor

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To help the City of Seattle achieve honest, efficient management and full accountability throughout City government. We serve the public interest by providing the City Council, Mayor and City department heads with accurate information, unbiased analysis, and objective recommendations on how best to use public resources in support of the well-being of the citizens of Seattle.

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City of Seattle  
Office of City Auditor

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September 5, 2012

City Councilmember Tim Burgess  
City Councilmember Sally Clark  
City Councilmember Sally Bagshaw  
City Councilmember Bruce Harrell  
City of Seattle  
Seattle, Washington 98104

Dear Councilmembers:

In September 2011, the then-members of the City Council's Public Safety and Education Committee asked the Office of City Auditor to work with George Mason University's Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy (CEBCP) to produce a comprehensive report on the evidence concerning the effectiveness of the City of Seattle's crime prevention programs. This brief companion document to the CEBCP report summarizes its results, and offers a set of potential next steps that the City could take to begin to improve the performance of its crime prevention efforts.

If you have any questions regarding this body of work, please contact Claudia Gross Shader at (206) 684-8038, [claudia.gross-shader@seattle.gov](mailto:claudia.gross-shader@seattle.gov) or me at (206) 233-1095, [davidg.jones@seattle.gov](mailto:davidg.jones@seattle.gov).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "David G. Jones".

David G. Jones  
City Auditor

Attachment

# Evidence-Based Assessment of the City of Seattle's Crime Prevention Programs:

## What have we learned, and what should we do next?



*“People have to recognize that they can’t jump to the top of the performance mountain right away. They have to ratchet-up performance.”*

- Robert D. Behn, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University



**Background:** In approving the 2011 budgets for the Human Services Department, Department of Neighborhoods, and Seattle Police Department, the Seattle City Council expressed its intent to review the City of Seattle's (City) crime prevention efforts. A November 10, 2010 City Council Statement of Legislative Intent stated: “The Council’s long term goal is to determine the best possible ways to implement crime prevention strategies that improve safety and the quality of life for citizens. How should these efforts be organized? Who should lead them? What are the specific outcomes we will seek? How will those outcomes be measured?”

A [May 2011 inventory of City crime prevention programs performed by the City Budget Office](#) (CBO) found 72 programs with crime prevention as either a primary, secondary, or indirect purpose. There were approximately 137 City employee positions and over \$13.2 million in contract dollars annually associated with those programs. The [CBO report concluded](#) that “a vast majority of the programs...do not measure outcomes, meaning they do not provide evidence of what difference those activities make.”

The City Council's Statement of Legislative Intent envisioned that a subsequent phase would examine the effectiveness of the crime prevention programs, and [Council Central Staff produced a preliminary report](#) on the evidence base for the effectiveness of some of the programs. In September 2011, the City Council's Public Safety and Education Committee asked the Office of City Auditor to work with George Mason University's Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy (CEBCP) to conduct a follow-up study that would include a comprehensive review of the crime prevention mechanisms, theoretical bases, and existing evaluative literature on the effectiveness of the 63<sup>1</sup> programs in the CBO inventory. CEBCP's assessment is attached. This brief companion document summarizes their findings and offers a set of potential next steps that the City could take to begin to improve the performance of its crime prevention efforts.

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<sup>1</sup> This review did not include the 9 programs from the original CBO inventory that relate to providing security for City facilities.

## What have we learned about the effectiveness of the City's crime prevention programs?

The attached report from the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy (CEBCP) describes current research in crime prevention practices and whether it indicates that City crime prevention programs are likely to be effective. The CEBCP findings are based on the information contained in the May 2011 City Budget Office (CBO) report, which provided only high-level descriptions of the programs and did not distinguish whether crime prevention was a primary, secondary, or indirect intended outcome.

This new CEBCP report is intended to initiate a conversation about how the City might better integrate the crime prevention work that it does with the research evidence about what is known to be effective. We encourage those who are intimately familiar with the City's programs to draw comparisons between the evidence-base and the City's efforts.

It is an important first step to understand whether research indicates that a program is likely to be effective in reducing crime. However, as the CBO noted in its May 2011 report, we cannot know whether these City programs are actually effective in reducing crime because many do not measure their outcomes. We hope that this report will also help inform a conversation about how the City might best be able to measure its crime prevention outcomes.

Below, we've summarized CEBCP's findings. In addition, Table 1, at the end of this paper, summarizes each City program by category including funding amounts and staffing.

### ● **Good Supporting Evidence for Some Programs**

Among the 63 City crime prevention programs,

#### Summary of Evidence for the 63 City Programs and 2011 funding levels

##### Strong/Moderate Evidence of Effectiveness:

**17** City programs significantly resemble or are replications of programs with strong (5) or moderate (12) potential for effectiveness in reducing crime.

- **Approximately \$2.9 million in contract funding;**
- **and approximately 21 staff positions (FTEs)**

##### Inconclusive Evidence of Effectiveness:

**35** programs are inconclusive in their potential for reducing crime. This includes:

- 9** that resemble programs with weak but positive supporting research evidence.
- 12** that resemble programs that do not have supporting research but do have supporting theory that indicates that they might be effective in reducing crime.
- 14** that resemble programs that have some evidence of mixed results on reducing crime.

- **Approximately \$3.8 million in contract funding;**
- **and approximately 72 FTEs**

##### Evidence of Potential for Increasing Crime:

**3** programs seem to resemble programs that have some research evidence that indicates possible "backfire effects" – i.e., potentially worsening crime rather than reducing crime.

- **Approximately 13 FTEs**

##### Unable to Match to Research or Theory:

**8** programs do not resemble any programs that have existing research evidence or any theory that indicates that they could be effective in reducing crime.

- **Approximately \$4.8 million in contract funding;**
- **and approximately 1.25 FTEs**

17 have at least moderate research evidence that indicates that they could be effective in reducing crime. However, the CEBCP authors caution that even programs using evidence-based approaches should measure their actual performance outcomes to ensure that the programs are achieving the intended crime reduction benefits.

- **Large City Investment in Programs that are Inconclusive**

This category includes 35 programs totaling approximately \$11 million in annual City expenditures (including contracts and City staff estimated at \$100,000 per FTE). These include City programs that resemble programs with weak research evidence, or that resemble programs shown to have mixed results in reducing crime. This category also includes City programs that do not resemble any programs that have been scientifically researched; however, the program may be able to be linked to a theory that might suggest crime reduction benefits.

- **Three Police Department Programs Have Potential to Increase Rather than Decrease Crime**

Three programs in the Seattle Police Department, with a total of up to 13 officers assigned, appear to be similar, according to their descriptions in the CBO May 2011 report, to programs that research has shown might have the unintended consequence of worsening crime rather than reducing it (i.e., “backfire” effect). These programs include a truancy program, a school emphasis officer program, and a proactive gang prevention program. More detailed information about these City programs will be needed to determine how closely they resemble programs that have had a backfire effect.

#### **What are some next steps that the City might take to improve its crime prevention efforts?**

Below is a list of three discrete next steps that the City might consider taking to continue to advance the City Council’s intention of determining the best possible ways to implement crime prevention strategies.

- **1: Address Potential Backfire Effects**

The CEBCP report cites research evidence of backfire effects in programs that may be similar to three City programs involving the Seattle Police Department: **the School Emphasis Truancy and Suspension Reduction Program, the School Emphasis Program, and the Proactive Gang Program**. A rigorous review and systematic comparison of the research with City programs would be a first step in addressing potential backfire effects. City programs should be compared to those studied in the research to examine purpose, methods, procedures and performance measures. The City may also choose to identify possibilities for adjusting these current City programs to incorporate methods that demonstrate stronger positive outcomes.

**Currently Underway:** The Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative (SYVPI) and the Seattle Police Department (SPD) are currently gathering more information about the activities of SPD’s school officers. This will allow the City to compare its programs with the research showing

potential negative effects. In addition, SYVPI has agreed to partner with CEBCP and a leading researcher on this subject from the University of Maryland to apply for a grant to conduct a rigorous evaluation. This will allow the City to learn about the effectiveness of the School Resource Officers who are deployed from SPD precincts as well as the SYVPI School Emphasis Officers (SEOs) who are assigned to middle schools within the SYVPI catchment areas. The SEOs use a unique strategy (including relationship-building, becoming an integral part of the school community, conflict resolution, service referrals, and home visits) that does not resemble any programs that have been studied to date.

## ● 2: Review and Respond to the Evidence

We would encourage all stakeholders from the 63 programs included in the CEBCP report to review the research cited in the report to begin a conversation about integrating scientific research with City crime prevention efforts. In addition, we propose that the City examine in-depth the research evidence for at least three of the programs that have crime prevention as their primary intended outcome and that utilize significant City resources. Elements of this examination might include: 1) a more thorough program description than time permitted in the CBO review, 2) a comparison of City program practices with the evidence-based practices, and 3) formulation of program logic models<sup>2</sup> and performance measures based on those used in effective programs studied in the research.

There are many good places to start; however, three potential programs for such an evaluation include:

**Teen Late Night Program** – Significant City staff resources are associated with this program including 12.14 FTE's and 1,800 hours of Police and Parks Department annual overtime. The program keeps youth off the street late at night by providing a place for positive activities. The research evidence points to greater crime reduction benefits for programs that are offered in the afternoon and those that focus on social skills, are structured, are linked to school curricula, and provide opportunities for one-on-one training. A comparison between the City's Teen Late Night Program and the evidence-base found in the [Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Model Programs Guide](#) might offer some helpful insights for increasing the program's crime prevention benefits.

**Street Outreach/Critical Incident Response** – This program, which includes a \$301,721 contract with Metrocenter YMCA, aims to engage youth in the Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative (SYVPI) and to de-escalate hostile situations. The research evidence for similar programs is mixed but includes at least one program that experienced significant backfire effects. In addition, the [National Network for Safe Communities](#) is a new resource that is documenting best practices and developing performance measures for evidence-based programs that include street outreach as a

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<sup>2</sup> "A **logic model** is a diagram of a process or system. Logic models help create a "theory of causation" that can connect work within an organization's direct control (e.g., its processes or outputs) to high-level outcomes of that work, things over which the agency has little influence." Source: Performance Measure Guide, State of Washington Office of Financial Management, August 2009.

component. A comparison of the Seattle program with the research literature might suggest ways to avoid backfire effects as well as increase crime prevention benefits.

**Community Police Team Program** – Significant Seattle Police Department resources are associated with this program that funds 21 police officers annually. These officers are a resource for precinct commanders to work on chronic crime problems and/or special projects that require longer term assignments. The only rigorous research evidence among similar programs that shows a significant impact on crime is related to the use of the problem-solving methods associated with problem-oriented policing. A review of the Community Police Team program could help to identify the extent to which problem-solving methods are used and to develop potential outcome measures.

In addition, there are already plans underway for evaluations of the following two crime prevention programs.

**Currently Underway:** The Seattle Neighborhood Group (SNG) has recently launched a pilot project to evaluate its Safe Communities program (2011 contract amount: \$381,330). Current program activities include: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design surveys, community appearance surveys, education in English (and 12 other languages as needed) on calling 911, landlord education for rental residential properties, community clean-ups, street light surveys, space activation activities, etc. SNG plans to evaluate their program based on crime statistics for 2-3 pilot areas, predictive indicators (such as number of people trained in effective crime reporting), and qualitative data based on community appearance pre and post pilot surveys.

**Currently Underway:** A process evaluation of the "IF" Project, that connects at-risk youth with current and former inmates to learn about the risks of offending, will be conducted in 2012-2013 by a research team from the Seattle University Criminal Justice Department. The process evaluation will document and analyze the early development and actual implementation of the "IF" Project and will include qualitative analysis, observations, and participant comments. This information is intended to help lay the groundwork for a more rigorous future outcome evaluation.

### ● 3: Build More City Capacity for Performance Leadership

[Robert Behn, Ph.D.](#), of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, is a leading researcher in the field of performance management and the Chair of Harvard's executive education program, [Driving Government Performance: Leadership Strategies that Produce Results](#). He advocates a series of incremental steps with small "wins" and opportunities for learning rather than the implementation of an enterprise-wide strategy for improving performance management. The two steps listed above, Addressing Potential Backfire Effects and Reviewing and Responding to the Evidence, would offer some learning opportunities and perhaps some small wins for the City in improving its performance management for crime prevention.

Some additional incremental steps that the City might consider include:

- Forming an interdepartmental performance management work group to oversee the ongoing review of crime prevention programs and outcomes;



- Providing continuing education on performance management/performance leadership for key staff in the Executive branch of City government; and
- Identifying lessons learned in performance leadership from the City's previous experience as well as the experience of other jurisdictions.

**Table 1: City of Seattle Crime Prevention Programs - Summary of Research Evidence**

Program	2011 FTE	2011 Contract \$
<b>Resemble or Replicate Programs with Strong Positive Evidence</b>		
Mentoring (SYVPI)	N/A	130,000
Methadone Voucher Program	N/A	526,073
Multisystemic Treatment Program	N/A	86,100
Nurse Family Partnership	N/A	539,816
Code Compliance Team (Seattle Nightlife Initiative)	1.25	N/A
<b>Total:</b>	<b>1.25</b>	<b>1,281,989</b>
<b>Resemble or Replicate Programs with Moderate Positive Evidence</b>		
Aggression Replacement Training (SYVPI)	N/A	60,000
Gang Resistance Education and Training (SYVPI)	N/A	N/A
Drug Market Initiative	0.1	26,000
Teen Late Night Program	12.14	N/A
Summer High Point Commons Program	0.61	N/A
Business Improvement Area Support	0.3	35,000
Pedestrian Lighting	1	N/A
Case Management (SYVPI)	1.75	700,000
South Park Initiative	N/A	232,763
Chemical Dependence Intervention	0.18	119,020
Power of Place (SYVPI)	3	N/A
Neighborhood Network Coordination/Intake and Referral (SYVPI)	1	513,910
<b>Total:</b>	<b>20.08</b>	<b>1,686,693</b>
<b>Inconclusive: Resemble or Replicate Programs with Weak but Positive Supporting Research Evidence</b>		
Abandoned Buildings Enforcement	1.8	N/A
Graffiti Abatement - Transportation	2	N/A
Graffiti Abatement – Parks	2	2,500
Graffiti Abatement – SPU	6	N/A
Graffiti Hotline – SPU	0.9	N/A
Graffiti Code Enforcement - SPU	1	N/A
Graffiti BIA Program – SPU	N/A	57,000
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design	1	N/A
Police Explorers	portion of 2 FTEs	N/A
<b>Total:</b>	<b>14.7</b>	<b>59,500</b>
<b>Inconclusive: No Evidence but Grounded in Theory</b>		
Chemical Dependency Intervention – Youth Engagement	N/A	177,863
Fire Stoppers	1	N/A
Neighborhood Matching Fund (SYVPI)	N/A	77,325
Community Matching Grants (SYVPI)	N/A	130,925
Youth Police Academy	portion of 2 FTEs	N/A
SPD Youth Dialogues	portion of 2 FTEs	N/A

SPD IF Project	portion of 2 FTEs	N/A
Vegetation Overgrowth Enforcement	1.0	N/A
Junk Storage Enforcement	2	N/A
Graffiti Outreach and Education (SPU)	1	N/A
Illegal Dumping Hotline	0.3	N/A
Illegal Dumping Inspection and Clean-up	3	284,250
<b>Total</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>670,363</b>

<b>Inconclusive: Resemble Programs That Have Evidence of Mixed Results on Reducing Crime</b>		
Indigent Batterers' Treatment	0.5	148,650
Battered Women's Shelters	0.1	785,994
Student Teen Employment Program	1.7	11,000
Lifeguard Training	0.33	N/A
Youth Employment Services (SYVPI)	N/A	549,520
South Park Recreation Teams, Boxing, and ESL	N/A	90,718
SPD Summer Youth Employment	portion of 2 FTEs	N/A
Neighborhood District Coordinators	11	N/A
Seattle Neighborhood Group Safe Communities	N/A	381,330
Only in Seattle	1	800,000
Street Outreach (SYVPI)	N/A	301,721
SPD Crime Prevention Coordinators	7	N/A
SPD Community Police Team Officers	21	N/A
Park Rangers	6	N/A
<b>Total</b>	<b>48.63</b>	<b>3,068,933</b>

<b>Resemble Programs That Have Evidence for Increasing Crime</b>		
School Emphasis Truancy and Suspension Reduction (SYVPI)	portion of 6 FTEs	N/A
School Emphasis Officers (SYVPI)	portion of 6 FTEs	N/A
Proactive Gang Prevention Unit	7	N/A
<b>Total</b>	<b>up to 13 FTE</b>	

<b>Unable to Match to Research or Theory for Crime Prevention</b>		
Prostituted Youth Residential Recovery	0.5	482,113
Prostituted Youth Advocacy	N/A	66,177
Co-STARS	N/A	400,000
CURB	0.5	247,200
GOTS	N/A	317,200
Housing First	0.25	2,332,644
Emergency Services Patrol for Inebriated Patients	N/A	542,116
Needle Exchange	N/A	406,112
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.25</b>	<b>4,793,562</b>

# EVIDENCE-BASED ASSESSMENT OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE'S CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS



7/1/2012

Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy  
George Mason University



Charlotte Gill, Ph.D.

with Cynthia Lum, Ph.D., Breanne Cave, M.A., Lisa Dario, M.S.,  
Cody Telep, M.A., Zoe Vitter, B.Sc., and David Weisburd, Ph.D.

# EVIDENCE-BASED ASSESSMENT OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE'S CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS

CENTER FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POLICY  
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY

In October 2011, the City of Seattle Office of City Auditor, at the request of the members of the City Council Public Safety and Education Committee, Councilmembers Tim Burgess, Sally Clark, and Sally Bagshaw, tasked the [Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy](#) at George Mason University (CEBCP) with conducting an evidence-based assessment of the City of Seattle's crime prevention programs. Earlier in 2011, the [City Budget Office \(CBO\)](#) developed an inventory of 72 "services that have crime prevention either as a primary purpose or a secondary or indirect purpose," and a review of both the resources required to run these services and their desired outcomes. In response to that report, City Councilmember Burgess requested that the CEBCP, an academic research center that specializes in evidence-based crime prevention research, conduct a follow-up study that would include a comprehensive review of the crime prevention mechanisms, theoretical bases, and existing evaluative literature underlying the 63 programs in the inventory that were not primarily security-based.<sup>1</sup>

CEBCP researchers assessed the descriptions provided in the CBO report for each of the 63 programs to identify their primary crime prevention mechanisms and theoretical bases, and then compared them against the most rigorous research evidence (studies employing at least quasi-experimental methods involving a comparison group). It is important to note at the outset that time and resources did not permit a full systematic literature review of all the available evidence for each program or a full process evaluation of Seattle's programs beyond the high-level CBO descriptions. Thus, this report should not be viewed as a comprehensive assessment of the programs or their evidence base. However, CEBCP drew upon highly-regarded repositories of existing reviews, meta-analyses, and primary research to draw parallels between Seattle's programs and the state of knowledge in crime prevention research more generally, including:

- The "[Maryland Report](#)" ([Sherman et al. 1997](#)) and its updates ([Sherman et al. 2002; 2006](#))
- [Campbell Collaboration Systematic Reviews](#)
- [The Evidence-Based Policing Matrix](#)
- [CrimeSolutions.gov](#) (OJP's "what works" clearinghouse)
- [OJJDP Model Programs Guide](#)
- Additional reviews and resources within or known to CEBCP (e.g., [Weisburd & Eck, 2004](#)).

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<sup>1</sup> Sixty-three programs were classified as non-security based in the CBO report. At the request of the Committee we included #64 (Park Rangers) from the security-based programs in our review, but excluded #31 (SPD Youth Outreach) because the CBO report also broke that program down into its distinct components (#32-#37).

In addition to presenting the findings of the evidence review, this report addresses some of the questions raised in the CBO report as well as a [May 2011 analysis](#) conducted by Peter Harris, of the City Council Central Staff. We provide recommendations to assist the City of Seattle in prioritizing program evaluations and shortening the list of programs classified as "crime prevention" based on a lack of good evidence or lack of a theoretical basis for crime control effectiveness. Following CBO's suggestion, we have also reclassified the crime prevention programs according to a modified version of the Maryland Report program categories:

- [Families/Early Intervention](#)
- [School-Based Prevention](#)
- [Community-Based Prevention](#)
- [Labor Markets](#)
- [Places](#)
- [Corrections and Treatment](#)
- [Victimization Prevention](#)
- [Indirect](#) (programs that do not have clear crime prevention objectives).

While the original classification into Housing and Treatment Services, Recreation, Learning and Employment Programs, Problem-Solving Programs, and Security Programs accurately represented the intended goals of Seattle's crime prevention programs, our location/target-based classification system is better suited to grouping the programs according to their theoretical and evidence base as well as highlighting the importance of places as well as individuals in crime prevention ([Weisburd, Maher, & Sherman, 1992](#); [Sherman, 1995](#); [Weisburd, 2008](#)).

This report is divided into three sections and three Appendices. In Section 1, we describe our methodology and classification scheme. In Section 2, we categorize Seattle's programs and analyze the proportion of those programs that are classified as evidence-based or promising and the City of Seattle's expenditure by category in terms of personnel time and contractors.<sup>2</sup> In Section 3, we discuss the findings of the evidence review and their implications for crime prevention policy and programming in Seattle. Appendix A comprises a 3x3 matrix displaying the 63 programs according to evidence quality and effectiveness, with links to descriptions of the evidence-base for each program. The matrix and associated descriptions will also be made available to the City as a Web-based tool. In Appendix B we provide additional detail on the broad theoretical basis, mechanisms of crime prevention, and evidence base in each broad category of program. Appendix C provides more details about the classification of programs according to the modified Maryland Report categories, and describes the broad theoretical and evaluative literature for each area.

## 1. Evidence Quality and Effectiveness Ratings

We have devised a classification scheme for Seattle's crime prevention programs that indicates both the potential effectiveness of each program according to the body of existing research evidence and the methodological quality of that evidence. In this section we provide a description of the classification scheme. Note that our scheme makes no representation as to the *actual* effectiveness of the specific programs implemented in Seattle. Our goal is to map Seattle's program's onto the existing evidence base, which has been developed from program evaluations across the United States and internationally, in order to identify which of Seattle's programs are likely to be effective or ineffective. As such, we classified the programs according to their

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<sup>2</sup> We use CBO's assessments of City FTE and contract amounts for the latter analysis.

potential for effectiveness rather than their actual measured effectiveness. We are not aware of any existing evaluations of any of the 63 programs currently operating in Seattle. We will discuss this point and its implications in greater detail later in this report.

Each program is categorized as follows:

- I. **Strong potential for effectiveness.** These programs closely resemble existing programs or practices that have been shown to achieve their intended outcomes in multiple rigorous evaluations. The evidence base includes mainly randomized controlled trials, in which participants or places are randomly assigned to the program or a control group; or rigorous quasi-experiments with a comparison group and statistical controls for bias. In some cases, Seattle programs in this category may follow an established protocol that has been validated elsewhere (for example, nurse-family partnerships), although a detailed examination of each program's implementation and fidelity to protocol was beyond the scope of this report. We consider Seattle programs in this category to be most likely to show a positive effect if evaluated.
- II. **Moderate potential for effectiveness.** Seattle programs in this category do not resemble programs with a solid evidence base. However, we consider them worthy of further evaluation because there are some indications in the existing literature that they could be effective. These programs are subdivided into three types, listed here in descending order of potential effectiveness:
  - A. *Promising programs.* Programs that resemble existing programs or strategies that do not yet have a strong evidence base, but one or two rigorous studies have indicated positive results.
  - B. *Lower-quality positive evaluations.* Programs that resemble existing programs or strategies that have shown positive outcomes, but only in controlled studies of lower rigor that have a greater potential for bias. In such studies, the treatment and control groups may not be well-matched, the participants may have been allowed to self-select into treatment or control groups, or the evaluation may have suffered from implementation problems or high attrition of participants.
  - C. *Similar to rigorously-evaluated effective programs.* Programs in this category are not supported by specific evidence, but an evidence base for effective outcomes exists for a program or setting that is substantially similar. For example, Seattle may use a program with juveniles that has never been evaluated with juveniles, but several rigorous studies have shown that the program is effective for adults. We cannot say with any certainty that the similar program in Seattle would also be effective because we cannot be sure that the underlying mechanisms are the same, but we consider it promising and deserving of further study.
- III. **Inconclusive.** Programs in this category could not easily be mapped against existing positive research findings. The programs are subclassified according to the reason why our assessment was inconclusive:
  - A. *Low-quality positive evaluations.* Programs resemble existing programs or strategies that have shown positive effects, but only in evaluations of low methodological rigor. These evaluations have a high potential for producing biased results because they do not include a comparison group, look at pre-post changes in outcomes

without controlling for other potential influences, and/or only report outcomes for program participants or completers.

- B. *Mixed results.* Programs closely resemble, or are similar to, existing programs or strategies that show either mixed or no evidence of effectiveness in studies of any methodological quality.<sup>3</sup>
  - C. *Similar to less rigorously-evaluated programs.* As II.C above, but the similar programs are not supported by a strong evidence-base. However, weaker controlled or uncontrolled studies have suggested that they may be effective.
  - D. *No evidence, but grounded in theory.* These programs do not have any similarities to existing evaluated strategies, but are based on a logic model that reflects principles of a recognized criminological theory. We may have identified evaluations of different programs based on similar mechanisms that showed promise. However, we cannot view these models as conclusive because very few criminological theories have been validated.
- IV. Potential for backfire.** Programs in this category are similar to existing programs or strategies for which the evaluation evidence, regardless of methodological quality, generally suggests outcomes are worse for program participants compared to control groups (for example, the program is associated with increased arrest rates for participants compared to controls).
- V. Unable to Match.** Programs in this category are not grounded in evidence or criminological theory:
- A. *No support.* Programs that have no supporting research or theoretical basis for potential effectiveness.
  - B. *Not crime prevention.* Programs that are not related to crime prevention and have other intended outcomes (see '[Indirect](#)' classification). Our assessment of potential effectiveness was based solely on outcomes related to crime prevention. A program may resemble a strategy that has not been tested for crime prevention effectiveness but has been found effective for other outcomes that indirectly relate to crime prevention, such as securing housing for the homeless. While there are criminological theories that support homelessness as a risk factor for offending and victimization, the lack of measured outcomes related to crime limits our ability to assess such a program as an effective crime prevention tool. These programs may still serve a useful social purpose, but not as part of a crime prevention agenda.


For ease of presentation, the various subcategories are collapsed in graphs and our recommendations below.

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<sup>3</sup> We combined evidence of any methodological quality in this category, based on the understanding that lower-quality evidence tends to show more positive results than higher-quality studies ([Weisburd, Lum, & Petrosino, 2001](#)). Thus, if low-quality studies also show no effect we can be more confident that we are not overstating the lack of effectiveness.



## 2. Findings




### Effectiveness and Evidence Quality

Overall, 43 programs of 63 (68%) resemble or are similar to some (positive or negative) research evidence of any quality, 17 (27%) are not similar to existing evidence (but 12 of these are grounded in theory), and 3 (5%) are classed as non-crime prevention programs. The chart above shows the evidence-base (according to the rating scheme set out above) for the set of programs.

- 5 programs (8%) have a strong potential for effectiveness.** These programs bear a close resemblance to existing programs that have been evaluated using mainly randomized controlled trials. Two of the programs in this category ([Multi-Systemic Therapy](#), [Nurse-Family Partnerships](#)) are individual-level programs aimed at treatment or family/early intervention strategies that appear to directly replicate evidence-based programs. In part, the strength of evidence of these programs reflects the availability of research in these areas. Individuals are easier to study under rigorous controlled conditions than groups or places, so better evidence is available. Treatment programs may also fall under health rather than social science research programs and funding streams, where there is more evaluation funding and a stronger culture of rigorous evidence (e.g. [Shepherd, 2003](#)).
- 12 programs (19%) have a moderate potential for effectiveness.** This category includes two programs ([Gang Resistance Education and Training](#), [Aggression Replacement Training](#)) that appear to directly replicate existing programs that are considered promising. For these two programs, an emerging evidence-base of strong studies suggest effectiveness but there are not yet sufficient studies to firmly draw this


conclusion. However, these two programs have the potential to move into the 'Strong' category in future. The remaining programs in this category resemble programs that have a positive evidence-base that is more limited in terms of methodological rigor, but still includes, at minimum, studies with non-equivalent comparison groups. We cannot rule out potential bias among these studies, but they give some indication of potential effectiveness. Five programs did not closely resemble an existing program, but we found an evidence-base for programs based on similar mechanisms of effectiveness.

- **35 programs (55%) are inconclusive**, i.e. resemble or are similar to studies with low quality positive evidence; resemble or are similar to evidence of any quality that shows no effects; or have no supporting evidence but are grounded in criminological theory, which improves their potential for effectiveness. In the former case, we caution that lower-quality evidence has been shown to produce more positive results than higher-quality studies ([Weisburd, Lum, & Petrosino, 2001](#)). However, this category includes a number of programs that have a clear foundation in criminological theory and have the potential to incorporate evidence-based strategies. While it is important to caution that few, if any, criminological theories have been *conclusively* validated by empirical research, the fact that these programs reflect fairly well-established mechanisms suggests they are amenable to further research and development. However, the majority of programs in this category resemble or are similar to programs that showed no evidence of effectiveness (i.e. crime outcomes did not change in response to the program - this category does not include programs that appeared to make outcomes worse). Some of the programs that did not show effects have not been assessed in a rigorous way, while other evaluations of similar programs have suffered from methodological or implementation issues that limit the conclusions that can be drawn from the research. It is not known whether these programs would show more promise (or backfire effects) under different conditions. It is also important to note that programs showing null effects may still be worth implementing when they represent a more cost-effective approach than the alternative.
- **3 programs (5%) have the potential to backfire** based on existing evidence from similar programs. Note that no Seattle program in this category directly resembled a program that has been found to backfire. However, carefully controlled research is needed to examine the different strategies used in these programs to learn which approaches are effective and which could cause harm.
- **8 programs (13%) could not be matched to existing research or theory.** None of these programs has an evidential or theoretical basis to suggest a crime prevention effect. Three of these eight programs were not clearly intended to prevent crime. The remaining five were not supported by evidence from research on similar theories or crime prevention mechanisms.



In general, City FTE allocation is highly concentrated among inconclusive programs, which was the largest category of programs. However, substantial time is also allocated to programs with moderate potential for effectiveness. Eleven full-time police officer positions are currently allocated to programs that may have a backfire effect.

Programs with strong or moderate evidence do receive a substantial portion of contract spending (see below). This reflects the fact that some of the more effective programs are treatment and family-based services that would be provided by outside organizations rather than city employees.



Non-crime prevention programs receive the most contracted crime prevention funding overall. This is largely driven by the Housing First program, which is intended for homelessness and residential

stability outcomes but has no direct crime prevention goals. It is positive that programs with a strong to moderate evidence-base are well funded. However, a considerable amount of money is spent on programs that have little evidence of effectiveness, or could not be matched to evidence or theory. From a budgetary perspective, efforts should be made to strengthen the measurement of inputs, outputs, and outcomes and better identify the crime prevention mechanisms of these programs.

### 3. Conclusions and Recommendations

#### Conclusions

- It is encouraging that over one-quarter of Seattle's crime prevention programs have strong to moderate evidence of potential for effectiveness. However, more work is needed to increase the number of programs that replicate or closely resemble existing evidence-based protocols.
- The majority (37 programs, 59%) of programs are connected to places and community settings. This is also encouraging. Although the evidence-base for community programs is mixed, the general consensus in the field is that communities are a promising target for prevention ([Sherman et al., 2006](#)). [Lipsey \(1992\)](#) also notes that treatment in community settings works well, especially for juveniles. Community-based prevention has the potential to be particularly effective in Seattle, given the city's strong tradition of community organizing.
- Many of Seattle's programs serve young people. Early intervention is one of the key principles of effective crime prevention programming (e.g. [Piquero et al., 2008](#)).

#### Recommendations

- The table below sets out our specific recommendations for each category of program. Overall, the first step for the City based on this report is to take stock of this set of programs and begin to establish the extent to which they resemble existing program protocols, or how less promising programs can be better aligned with favorable, high-quality evidence.
- Assessing the implementation of Seattle's programs in practice was outside the scope of this report. However, implementation is crucial and should be a focus of continued efforts to monitor effective programming. Even theoretically sound models fail without good implementation (e.g. [Altschuler & Armstrong, 1994](#)), and many of the programs examined here do not have a strong evidence-base largely because of implementation problems in the existing research. [Lipsey \(1992\)](#) notes that the most effective programs provide greater dosage and intensity in the intervention. Programs that involve researchers in development and evaluation are also shown to be better implemented, lending further support to the suggestion of involving research links in crime prevention programming.
- Related to the implementation issue, it is important to stress that only a handful of Seattle's programs appear to be directly based on existing protocols, and we have not assessed the extent to which they actually adhere to those protocols. Attention should be paid to confirming or checking local protocols to bring them in line with the evidence-base as far as possible (see 'Summary of Recommendations'). One of the challenges of prevention research is the ability to 'scale up' research projects into full initiatives in different locations. [Elliot & Mihalic \(2004\)](#) caution that attempts to

implement established protocols in new locations require attention to site readiness, site capacity, preparation, and balancing fidelity to protocol with local conditions and culture. The City or program managers can provide oversight of this process for those programs that need further development or enhancement, perhaps by bringing in personnel from existing evidence-based programs and/or local experts to provide training and technical assistance, ensure protocols are being followed, and advise on adapting programs to local conditions and leveraging the support of the local community.

- The City should ensure that programs are clearly targeted towards risk factors/problems and needs for the people or places involved. One of the difficulties in measuring success, especially in community settings, is a lack of focus in programming. Several of Seattle's community and place-based programs employ a wide range of strategies, which makes the evaluation of effectiveness problematic.
- The CBO and Harris reports mention, and our research team confirmed, that many of the desired outcomes for the Seattle programs are actually outputs (for example, the number of people using a service). Programs should be required to develop measurable and relevant *outcomes*: crime prevention programs should measure effects on crime as a primary or secondary outcome. City agencies, including Seattle Police Department, should collaborate and share data as appropriate, and researchers from local universities can help to develop frameworks for evaluation. We suggest setting aside a small percentage of the crime prevention programming budget for building research and evaluation links with local researchers and universities.
- The key is to develop a strategy for sustainability so that programs could continue to run successfully and provide full information on outputs and outcomes after research ends. This is especially important for those expensive programs that do not appear to have a strong basis in research evidence (encouragingly, most Seattle programs have at least a firm basis in criminological theory). We recommend that before the next round of contract funding, program managers should focus on documenting the program's logic model for prevention and developing a set of measurable outcomes.

## Summary of Recommendations

Seattle Program Status	Categories	Action	Relevant Programs
Closely resembles a tested model with high quality evidence	<a href="#">I</a> , <a href="#">II.A</a>	Confirm local protocols to ensure fidelity to tested model	<a href="#">11</a> <a href="#">16</a> <a href="#">17</a> <a href="#">18</a> <a href="#">47</a> <a href="#">12</a> <a href="#">37</a>
Closely resembles a tested model with medium to low quality evidence	<a href="#">II.B</a> , <a href="#">III.A</a>	Check local protocols Conduct further review to see if research base has improved Conduct rigorous local evaluations	<a href="#">9</a> <a href="#">25</a> <a href="#">26</a> <a href="#">46</a> <a href="#">51</a> <a href="#">40</a> <a href="#">50</a> <a href="#">53</a>
Similar to a tested model with high quality evidence	<a href="#">II.C</a>	Develop local protocols Conduct rigorous local evaluations	<a href="#">10</a> <a href="#">13</a> <a href="#">14</a> <a href="#">24</a> <a href="#">48</a>
Similar to a tested model with medium to low quality evidence	<a href="#">III.C</a>	Develop local protocols Conduct further review to see if research base has improved Conduct rigorous local evaluations	<a href="#">34</a> <a href="#">43</a> <a href="#">57</a> <a href="#">58</a> <a href="#">59</a> <a href="#">61</a>
Based on theory but no evidence	<a href="#">III.D</a>	Conduct rigorous local evaluations Develop local protocols	<a href="#">20</a> <a href="#">21</a> <a href="#">28</a> <a href="#">30</a> <a href="#">33</a> <a href="#">35</a> <a href="#">36</a> <a href="#">41</a> <a href="#">42</a> <a href="#">60</a> <a href="#">62</a> <a href="#">63</a>
No effect or backfire effect	<a href="#">IV</a>	Check local protocols Conduct rigorous local evaluations Conduct cost-benefit analysis	<a href="#">2</a> <a href="#">22</a> <a href="#">27</a> <a href="#">44</a> <a href="#">56</a> <a href="#">3</a> <a href="#">23</a> <a href="#">29</a> <a href="#">32</a> <a href="#">39</a> <a href="#">45</a> <a href="#">49</a> <a href="#">55</a> <a href="#">64</a> <a href="#">38</a> <a href="#">52</a> <a href="#">54</a>
No connection to evidence or theory	<a href="#">V.A</a>	Conduct rigorous local evaluations Develop local protocols if evaluations show promise	<a href="#">4</a> <a href="#">5</a> <a href="#">6</a> <a href="#">7</a> <a href="#">8</a>
Not crime prevention	<a href="#">V.B</a>	Identify desired outcome (e.g., reducing homelessness); eliminate from consideration in crime prevention review	<a href="#">1</a> <a href="#">15</a> <a href="#">19</a>

## APPENDIX A: CITY OF SEATTLE CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS: EVIDENCE-BASE AND QUALITY

This matrix is intended to be used in conjunction with the numbered list of programs in the CBO report. Click a program number to view details of the evidence-base for specific programs.

<b>I. STRONG</b>	<a href="#">11</a> <a href="#">16</a> <a href="#">17</a> <a href="#">18</a> <a href="#">47</a>
<b>II. MODERATE</b>	<b>A. Promising programs</b> <a href="#">12</a> <a href="#">37</a>
	<b>B. Lower-quality positive evaluations</b> <a href="#">9</a> <a href="#">25</a> <a href="#">26</a> <a href="#">46</a> <a href="#">51</a>
	<b>C. Similar to rigorously-evaluated effective programs</b> <a href="#">10</a> <a href="#">13</a> <a href="#">14</a> <a href="#">24</a> <a href="#">48</a>
<b>III. INCONCLUSIVE</b>	<b>A. Low-quality positive evaluations</b> <a href="#">40</a> <a href="#">50</a> <a href="#">53</a>
	<b>B. Mixed results</b> <a href="#">2</a> <a href="#">3</a> <a href="#">22</a> <a href="#">23</a> <a href="#">27</a> <a href="#">29</a> <a href="#">32</a> <a href="#">39</a> <a href="#">44</a> <a href="#">45</a> <a href="#">49</a> <a href="#">55</a> <a href="#">56</a> <a href="#">64</a>
	<b>C. Similar to less rigorously-evaluated programs</b> <a href="#">34</a> <a href="#">43</a> <a href="#">57</a> <a href="#">58</a> <a href="#">59</a> <a href="#">61</a>
	<b>D. No evidence, but grounded in theory</b> <a href="#">20</a> <a href="#">21</a> <a href="#">28</a> <a href="#">30</a> <a href="#">33</a> <a href="#">35</a> <a href="#">36</a> <a href="#">41</a> <a href="#">42</a> <a href="#">60</a> <a href="#">62</a> <a href="#">63</a>
<b>IV. POTENTIAL BACKFIRE</b>	<a href="#">38</a> <a href="#">52</a> <a href="#">54</a>
<b>V. UNABLE TO MATCH</b>	<b>A. No support</b> <a href="#">4</a> <a href="#">5</a> <a href="#">6</a> <a href="#">7</a> <a href="#">8</a>
	<b>B. Not crime prevention</b> <a href="#">1</a> <a href="#">15</a> <a href="#">19</a>

*Italics denote programs that are similar to, but do not closely resemble, existing programs*



## APPENDIX B: CITY OF SEATTLE NON-LAW ENFORCEMENT CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS

### Families/Early Intervention

#### South Park Initiative (Case Management and Basic Life/Social Skills)

CBO Program #: 13

Category: [Families/Early Intervention](#)

Evidence Rating: [II.C](#)

City FTE: N/A

Contracts: \$232,763

Mechanisms: Providing case management, social skills training, technology training, physical activity and literacy development to promote prosocial attitudes, and rehabilitation.

Theoretical Basis: Strain theory indicates that providing legitimate educational and employment opportunities may reduce delinquency.

Evidence Base: Rigorous evidence exists on one element of the South Park Initiative: social skills training. [Piquero et al. \(2010\)](#) conducted a [Campbell Systematic Review](#) of high-quality experimental evidence on programs to increase self-control through learning social skills. These programs were effective in improving self-control and reducing delinquency and other problem behaviors. [Lipsey and Wilson's \(1993\)](#) meta-analysis of juvenile programming indicates that psychological, educational, and behavioral treatment have positive effects on crime outcomes.

#### Multisystemic Treatment Program

CBO Program #: 17

Category: [Families/Early Intervention](#)

Evidence Rating: [I](#)

City FTE: N/A

Contracts: \$86,100

Mechanisms: The family-unit is analyzed and treated in order to change environmental factors for the youth.

Theoretical Basis: Social control theory suggests that improving prosocial bonding within the family and other social institutions is protective against crime. Learning theory and differential association suggest that delinquent behavior is learned from interactions with others, so family attitudes to offending may lead to delinquency. Environmental risk factors for crime within the home, such as parental conflict, are addressed.

Evidence Base: Rigorous evidence generally shows positive effects for MST. [Henggeler and Melton \(1992\)](#) report that "...youths who received MST had fewer arrests and self-reported offenses and spent an average of 10 fewer weeks incarcerated," as well as reporting increased family cohesion and decreased youth aggression in peer relations. Although a [Campbell Systematic Review \(Littell et al., 2005\)](#) finds no significant effects across a wider range of rigorous studies, other reviews such as the [Maryland Report](#) and [Crimesolutions.gov](#) state that family therapy and parent training about delinquent and at-risk preadolescents reduces risk factors for delinquency (see also [Tremblay & Craig, 1995](#)).

#### Nurse Family Partnerships - Best Beginnings

CBO Program #: 18

Category: [Families/Early Intervention](#)

Evidence Rating: [I](#)

City FTE: N/A

Contracts: \$539,816

Mechanisms: Nurse-family partnerships seek to alter environmental factors during pregnancy and early childhood years to affect later life outcomes for both children and their families.

Theoretical Basis: Social control theory suggests that improving prosocial bonding within the family and other social institutions is protective against crime. Learning theory and differential association suggest that delinquent behavior is learned from interactions with others, so family attitudes to offending may lead to delinquency. Environmental risk factors for crime, such as parental conflict, may affect a



child's early development, and psychological risk factors for crime may be exacerbated by problems during pregnancy and early childhood.

**Evidence Base:** There is a strong and rigorous evidence-base for the effectiveness of Nurse Family Partnerships, which were developed by David Olds. The evidence is summarized at [Crimesolutions.gov](http://Crimesolutions.gov) and in two Campbell Systematic Reviews ([Piquero et al., 2008](#); [Scher et al., 2006](#)). The reviews conclude that "early family/parent training should continue to be used to prevent child behavior problems such as conduct problems, antisocial behavior, and delinquency among young persons in the first five years of life." However, early family programs do not show consistent evidence of effectiveness for other outcomes, such as altering sexual activity or pregnancy risk among youth.

## School-Based Prevention

### Gang Resistance Education and Training (SYVPI)

CBO Program #: 37

Category: [School-based Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [II.A](#)

City FTE: 2.00 (portion of 6 full-time police officers dedicated to the school-based programs).

Contracts: N/A

**Mechanisms:** This is a school-based cognitive education program given by police officers to prevent delinquency and gang involvement, and provide life skills and family assistance, behavioral and attitudinal change

**Theoretical Basis:** Differential association and differential reinforcement theory: young people learn criminal orientations through interaction with others; criminal behavior is more likely when a young person is exposed to social messages unfavorable to law rather than prosocial messages. Since all behavior is learned, new prosocial cognitions can also be learned. Education could also create a general (for all youth) or specific (for youth already involved in or at risk of gang activity) deterrent effect.

**Evidence Base:** This is a national program with a specific curriculum and criteria. There are high quality studies of the program, which are summarized in the [OJJDP Model Programs Guide](#). The [initial evaluation in the 1990s](#) used a quasi-experimental design with a long-term follow up. No reduction in gang involvement was found, but four years after participating in the program G.R.E.A.T. students reported less victimization and risk seeking behavior, more association with prosocial peers, favorable attitudes toward law enforcement and unfavorable attitudes to gangs compared to controls. The curriculum was revised and is currently being evaluated using a randomized controlled design. [Preliminary findings](#) at the one-year follow-up show significant differences between G.R.E.A.T. participants and controls in terms of positive attitudes toward police, unfavorable attitudes to gangs, improved resistance to peer pressure, and less gang membership and delinquency. These results are promising and continued research will indicate if they are sustained over time.

### School Emphasis Truancy and Suspension Reduction

CBO Program #: 38

Category: [School-based Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [IV](#)

City FTE: 2.00 (portion of 6 full-time police officers dedicated to the school-based programs).

Contracts: N/A

**Mechanisms:** Home visits and school-based work by school police officers to prevent truancy through family-based prevention, referrals to services, and mediation.

**Theoretical Basis:** Social control theory suggests that improving prosocial bonding within the family and other social institutions is protective against crime. Learning theory and differential association suggest that delinquent behavior is learned from interactions with others, so family attitudes to offending may lead to delinquency. Environmental risk factors for crime within the home may be addressed.

**Evidence Base:** The [OJJDP Model Programs Guide](#) reports that there is only limited, non-rigorous evidence on truancy prevention. Some of this research shows positive effects, but the Truant Recovery Program ([White et al., 2001](#)), which is most similar to Seattle's program, led to a slight backfire effect on delinquency. This program authorized local police to make contact with young people on the streets during school hours and to contact and meet with their parents and/or return them to school. The

program, which used a pre/post design without a comparison group, found lower rates of absence and disciplinary action and increased conformity to school rules after the program compared to before; however, there was a slight, non-significant increase in arrests and formal contact with the juvenile justice system. Problems of missing data and a weaker study design cast some doubt on the findings.

### School Emphasis Officers (SYVPI)

CBO Program #: 52

Category: [School-based Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [IV](#)

City FTE: 2.00 (portion of 6 full-time police officers dedicated to the school-based programs).

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: School Emphasis Officers (school police officers) seek to reduce violence through mediation and referrals to SYVPI. They provide surveillance of activities and aim to increase student trust so students will report crime to them

Theoretical Basis: Presence of officers provide a general deterrent to students to discourage them from delinquent behavior in school committing crime. Routine activities theory suggests that increased guardianship may break the nexus between a motivated offender and suitable target.

Evidence Base: There is very little evidence on the effectiveness of school police officers. The first national study, a quasi-experiment by [Na and Gottfredson \(2011\)](#) suggests that increasing presence of police in schools is significantly related to increases in per capita weapon/drug crimes. It is not significantly related to increases in any other crime type, but there is no evidence that officer presence decreased any crime type (compare [Theriot \(2009\)](#), who found variable results according to crime type). Qualitative research by [Kupchik \(2010\)](#) finds that less serious incidents are more likely to be responded to by the juvenile justice system rather than internally when school police officers are present. Rather than directly causing an increase in crime, this is more likely a surveillance/reporting effect, whereby incidents are more likely to come to the attention of the police because of their presence within the school. However, a [Campbell Systematic Review](#) by [Petrosino et al. \(2010\)](#) shows that formal contact with the juvenile justice system can increase future delinquency when compared to doing nothing or resolving situations outside the criminal justice system. Thus, turning to the police and juvenile justice system to respond to incidents rather than resolving them in school may have negative consequences in the longer term.

## Community-Based Prevention

### Case Management (SYVPI)

CBO Program #: 10

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [II.C](#)

City FTE: 1.75

Contracts: \$700,000

Mechanisms: Treatment for at-risk youth including counseling, skill building, and behavioral programs to reduce delinquency risk and promote antisocial behavior.

Theoretical Basis: Differential association and differential reinforcement theory: young people learn criminal orientations through interaction with others; criminal behavior is more likely when a young person is exposed to social messages unfavorable to law rather than prosocial messages.

Evidence Base: In general, programs emphasizing individual counseling, interpersonal skills, behavioral programs, and family support show consistently positive effects for both institutionalized and non-institutionalized youth. The evidence-base for effective juvenile programs is very strong, based on at least 200 experimental and quasi-experimental studies (e.g. [Lipsey, Wilson, & Cothorn, 2000](#)).

### Mentoring (SYVPI)

CBO Program #: 11

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [I](#)

City FTE: N/A

Contracts: \$130,000

Mechanisms: Young people are paired with adults or peers who provide support and guidance to promote prosocial rather than antisocial attitudes and behavior.

Theoretical Basis: Differential association and differential reinforcement theory: young people learn criminal orientations through interaction with others; criminal behavior is more likely when a young person is exposed to social messages unfavorable to law rather than prosocial messages. Since all behavior is learned, new prosocial cognitions can also be learned.

Evidence Base: [Campbell Systematic Review](#) by [Tolan et al. \(2008\)](#) shows moderate but positive effects on delinquency based on 39 randomized controlled trials and quasi-experiments. The authors state that “mentoring may be valuable for those at-risk or already involved in delinquency and for associated outcomes.” However, the authors state that few of the studies they reviewed clearly stated the content of the mentoring program, so we do not know exactly which strategies make mentoring effective. Similar Big Brothers, Big Sisters programs have also been shown to have moderate positive effects on delinquency ([Greenberg, Domitrovich, & Bumbarger, 2000](#)).

### Youth Engagement

CBO Program #: 20

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.D](#)

City FTE: N/A

Contracts: \$177,863

Mechanisms: The program provides referrals, chemical dependency treatment, mentoring, and other services intended to address crime risk factors.

Theoretical Basis: The variety of services are rooted in social control theory, which suggests that improved prosocial bonding with social institutions is protective against crime; strain theories, which suggest that a lack of conventional, legitimate opportunities leads to delinquency, early psychological and environmental intervention, and routine activities.

Evidence Base: A [Campbell Systematic Review](#) ([Morton & Montgomery, 2011](#)) on the effectiveness of youth empowerment programs for improving self-efficacy and self-esteem examines two well-designed but small studies, but concludes that the rigorous research base is currently insufficient to draw conclusions. Crime outcomes were not measured. However, the program may have similarities to other promising practices such as mentoring, case management and skills training.

### Firestoppers Youth Firesetting Intervention Program

CBO Program #: 21

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.D](#)

City FTE: 1.00

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: The program identifies firestarters and provides intervention using case management and public education.

Theoretical Basis: Education against firestarting could have a general (for all youth) or specific (for youth already involved in firestarting) deterrent effect. Case management and treatment aims to improve environmental risk factors, foster positive social control, and encourage learning of prosocial rather than antisocial behavior.

Evidence Base: There is no evidence on specific programs to prevent firestarting; however, general research based on rigorous evidence indicates that [cognitive-behavioral therapy](#) ([Lipsey et al., 2007](#)), [multi-systemic therapy](#), and [mentoring](#) (especially by professionals) are useful in changing behavior. It appears that this program targets youth who are already involved in firestarting; public education of all youth may be less effective, given similar education programs like [DARE](#), which evidence indicates are not effective.

### Power of Place (SYVPI)

CBO Program #: 24

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [II.C](#)

City FTE: 3.00

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: This program aims to keep young people off the streets while fostering civic engagement, and a focus on youth mentoring youth.

Theoretical Basis: Promoting prosocial bonding with social institutions within the community increases positive social control and may protect against delinquency. Routine activities theory is connected to the idea that opportunities for offending will be reduced if young people are not engaged in unsupervised socializing on the streets.

Evidence Base: [OJJDP Model Programs Guide](#) describes similar leadership and youth development programs as effective, with a small but growing base of high quality evidence. Programs that promote competencies and social, emotional, or cognitive development are highly effective in reducing delinquency and risky behavior. "A program can be considered a youth development program when it intentionally incorporates experiences and learnings to address and advance the positive development of children and youth." Examples pertinent to Power of Place include service learning and working with community organizations and socializing systems like museums and libraries. These programs build self esteem, personal and social development, and moral reasoning skills. Constructive use of time is key to achieving these outcomes.

### Teen Late Night Program

CBO Program #: 25

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [II.B](#)

City FTE: 12.14 plus 1,800 hours Police and Parks overtime

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: This program keeps youth off the streets at night by providing a safe place to hang out and prosocial activities to engage in

Theoretical Basis: Promoting prosocial bonding with social institutions within the community increases positive social control and may protect against delinquency. Routine activities theory is connected to the idea that opportunities for offending will be reduced if young people are not engaged in unsupervised socializing on the streets.

Evidence Base: The [Maryland Report](#) and its update ([Sherman et al., 2006](#)) describe recreation programs to keep young people off the streets after school as "promising." After-school recreation programs that improve skills in sports, music, dance, and scouting can reduce delinquency, arrests, and drug use. The research evidence is of moderate quality. Some studies have control groups, but others have weak designs and problems of poor implementation and attrition. The [OJJDP Model Programs Guide](#) is more cautious, noting that the most effective programs focus on social skills, more structure and scheduling, strong links to school curricula, engaging qualified and well trained staff, and providing opportunities for one-on-one training. In addition, there is some evidence that the highest risk time for juvenile offending is during the school day or directly after school (peaking at 3-4pm) rather than at night, so effective supervision-based programs may be best directed at these times. [Gottfredson, Gottfredson, and Weisman \(2001\)](#) found that youth who are unsupervised in the direct after-school period tend to be more delinquent at all times. Crime prevention effects of recreational programs have also been shown to wear off fairly quickly if not sustained, and from a place based perspective may be limited to the immediate area around the recreation site ([Sherman et al., 2006](#)).

### Summer High Point Commons Program

CBO Program #: 26

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [II.B](#)

City FTE: 0.61

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: This program provides prosocial activities to keep young people off streets during summer vacation

Theoretical Basis: Promoting prosocial bonding with social institutions within the community increases positive social control and may protect against delinquency. Routine activities theory is connected to the idea that opportunities for offending will be reduced if young people are not engaged in unsupervised socializing on the streets.

Evidence Base: Research on summer programs is contained in the general after-school recreational program literature described under the [Teen late night program](#) above. The High Point Commons program is

described as “sometimes educational,” and the evidence suggests that this aspect could be promoted. [Sherman et al. \(2006\)](#) note that simply keeping youth out of trouble does not seem to be enough to promote crime control benefits. Programs based on supervised socializing also need to tailor skills training approaches through recreational activities.

### South Park Initiative (RecTech Teens, Boxing and ESL)

CBO Program #: 29

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)

City FTE: N/A

Contracts: \$90,718

Mechanisms: This program provides a variety of services, including academic support, language skills and supervised prosocial activities.

Theoretical Basis: Promoting prosocial bonding with social institutions within the community increases positive social control and may protect against delinquency. Routine activities theory is connected to the idea that opportunities for offending will be reduced if young people are not engaged in unsupervised socializing on the streets. Strain theory suggests that denial of access to legitimate opportunities may lead to delinquency; language barriers may be related to actual or perceived denial of access.

Evidence Base: There is mixed evidence of variable quality for the different aspects of this program. See the [Teen Late Night Program](#) for evidence on the effectiveness of recreational programs. The evidence on academic support is somewhat limited in terms of evaluations of specific approaches, like the computer-aided training outside a school context provided by this program. However, the [OJJDP Model Programs Guide](#) reports a strong body of research showing a clear connection between academic failure and delinquency. Students who experience high academic achievement and attachment to school are less likely to be involved in delinquency; conversely academic failure is generally a risk factor for delinquency (although there is some disagreement over how these effects vary across different demographic characteristics). “The underlying point... is that for some students academic failure produces frustration and poor study habits. This, in turn, can initiate a chain of events that lead to a withdrawal from and rejection of participation in classroom activities, prompting some youth to become disruptive in class or even drop out of school. If left unchecked, this behavior can eventually lead to delinquency and other serious problem behaviors ([Elliot and Voss, 1974](#)). Research has also shown significant differences in language skills between matched samples of delinquent and non-delinquent juvenile males ([Davis et al., 1991](#)), which provides an empirical basis for language skill programs.

The South Park Initiative also includes a gang monitoring element. The [Maryland Report](#) found that gang monitoring by community workers and probation and police officers was promising, although similar programs can increase crime if they increase gang cohesion ([Sherman et al., 1998](#)). However, there is little strong research on gang prevention through afterschool programs, detached workers, etc., and the findings generally do not show strong effects. There may even be backfire effects for crisis intervention with detachment officers.

### If Project (SPD Youth Outreach)

CBO Program #: 33

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.D](#)

City FTE: 0.40 (portion of 2 full-time police officers dedicated to the Youth Outreach program (#32-36).

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: This program provides community engagement for at-risk youth and programs that connect them with current and former inmates to learn about the risks of offending.

Theoretical Basis: Promoting prosocial bonding with social institutions within the community increases positive social control and may protect against delinquency or reduce offending for the inmate involved with the project. Learning about the consequences of offending from inmates may have a deterrent effect on delinquency and later offending.

Evidence Base: There is no specific evidence of programs similar to the If Project. The project incorporates a number of elements and whether it is effective will depend on the strategies that are emphasized most. The program appears to attempt to change criminal thinking among inmates and deter youth from becoming involved in delinquency. If [cognitive-behavioral therapy techniques are used to](#)

[discourage criminal thinking, evidence suggests that the program could be effective. Similarly, mentoring and referral to services for at-risk youth are also strongly supported by evidence](#) (see [Case Management](#) and [Mentoring](#) programs above), to the extent that these approaches are used. A forthcoming Seattle University evaluation will seek to clarify the precise content of this program.

### Youth Police Academy; Donut Dialogues/Role Reversals (SPD Youth Outreach)

CBO Program #: 35, 36

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.D](#)

City FTE: 0.80 across both programs (portion of 2 full-time police officers dedicated to the Youth Outreach program (#32-36).

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: These programs offer education about the operations of the police department, and opportunities for young people to provide the police with feedback. Donut Dialogues brings together homeless youth with communities, business leaders, and the police to challenge preconceived notions of each other and promote civic engagement

Theoretical Basis: Promoting prosocial bonding with social institutions within the community increases positive social control and may protect against delinquency. Routine activities theory is connected to the idea that opportunities for offending will be reduced if young people are not engaged in unsupervised socializing on the streets. Theories of legitimacy suggest that people are more likely to obey the law if they trust the police and feel the police treat them with respect and fairness.

Evidence Base: The [Maryland Report](#) and its update ([Sherman et al. \(2006\)](#)) report a lack of evidence on community engagement and empowerment programs; however, there is a consensus that they are useful. The lack of evidence is likely due to the wide variation between programs fitting this broad description, and none of the programs described in the report are similar to these programs. Enhancement of police legitimacy is a possible outcome of these programs, which suggests that they could have a positive, if indirect effect on crime prevention (see [Summer Youth Employment](#), above). However, the actual implementation of the program must reflect a two-way dialogue in practice. If the programs (especially the academy) become more focused on the police educating youth and less on enhancing feedback and engagement, they could become more akin to unsuccessful education and deterrence programs like [DARE](#).

### Neighborhood District Coordinator Program

CBO Program #: 39

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)

City FTE: 11.00

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: This program aims to connect citizens to government (civil engagement, problem solving); participate in community-based crime prevention programs; and become involved in problem-solving projects based on situational crime prevention and identifying repeat offenders.

Theoretical Basis: Social disorganization theory suggests that crime can occur when there is a lack of cohesion among residents of a neighborhood. Conversely, collective efficacy, which indicates social cohesion and the community's willingness to work together for the common good, offers protection against crime and disorder.

Evidence Base: Highly rigorous experiments and quasi-experiments have been conducted on similar programs. Results are mixed, although some programs are promising. Communities That Care programs are promising but evaluations have suffered from substantial implementation issues and difficulty determining the causal mechanisms of crime reductions ([France & Crow, 2005](#)). Evaluations of officer-led community policing programs, such as [Project ROAR](#), show no significant differences between treatment and control. A forthcoming Campbell Systematic Review of community-oriented policing<sup>4</sup> indicates that a wide variety of strategies fall under the banner of community policing, which limits the ability to draw conclusions about effective practices. Interventions aimed at increasing self-initiated community programs are generally less successful at crime prevention, while door-to-door visits by police can be more successful at reducing negative perceptions of the police and fear of crime. See also [Connell et al. \(2008\)](#); [Giacomazzi \(1995\)](#); [Pate et al. \(1987\)](#); [Pate &](#)

<sup>4</sup> Not currently available online; contact the author of this report for details.



[Skogan \(1985\)](#); [Skogan et al. \(1995\)](#); [Wycoff & Skogan \(1993\)](#); [Wycoff et al. \(1985\)](#); [Papachristos et al. \(2007\)](#); [Weisburd et al. \(2008a\)](#); [Taylor et al. \(2011\)](#); [Martin & Sherman \(1986\)](#); [Buerger \(1994\)](#); [Weisburd & Eck \(2004\)](#).

### Safe Communities

CBO Program #: 44

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)

City FTE: 0.10

Contracts: \$381,330

Mechanisms: Community-based partnership programs based on community building, information dissemination, and problem solving, including crime analysis, community engagement with police and housing authority, crime prevention and personal safety training and brochures, drug-free communities, drug education and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED).

Theoretical Basis: Social disorganization theory suggests that crime can occur when there is a lack of cohesion among residents of a neighborhood. Conversely, collective efficacy, which indicates social cohesion and the community's willingness to work together for the common good, offers protection against crime and disorder. Routine activities and opportunity theories focus on the nexus between motivated offenders, suitable targets and a lack of capable guardianship, suggesting that guardianship and offender crackdown strategies like hot spots policing may be effective for crime prevention.

Evidence Base: A large number of strategies are involved in this program, which causes difficulty in assessing the evidence base and understanding which tactics or combinations of tactics are most effective.

- Multiple randomized experiments of hotspots policing programs have shown that increasing police presence at crime hotspots reduces crime with minimal displacement and possible diffusion of benefits ([Sherman & Weisburd, 1995](#); [Weisburd & Green, 1995](#); [Weisburd et al., 2006](#); [Braga & Bond, 2008](#)).
- Increased police patrol and problem-solving interventions in high crime areas are generally effective in reducing crime in disorder in targeted areas without displacement. Focusing specifically on interventions that attempted to involve community members in the policing strategy, problem-oriented policing and community policing interventions in focused on closing drug dealing locations and facilitating offender reentry into high crime areas have been effective in reducing crime ([Green, 1993](#); [1995](#); [1996](#); [Mazerolle et al., 1998](#); [McCabe, 2009](#)).
- Evaluation of "reassurance policing" in the United Kingdom shows reduced crime, increased confidence in the police, and improved police-community cooperation ([Tuffin et al., 2006](#)).
- Weak evidence shows general crime declines in areas that have received "drug-free communities" (DFC) funding and less substance abuse in DFC coalition areas, although these national level studies do not indicate the mechanisms by which DFCs work ([Weatherly, Porowski, & Springer, 2011](#); [The White House, 2011](#)).
- Over 70 quasi-experimental evaluations exist of police communication and publicity programs, with variable effects. Increased reporting of incidents involving vulnerable elderly adults followed home visitation and pamphlets, but there were no effects on victimization of monthly newsletters describing crime data or community meetings with the police. Overall, general publicity, such as posters and leaflets, are less effective than publicity about specific police operations and door-to-door campaigns ([Pate et al., 1985](#); [Wycoff & Skogan, 1993](#); [Knoxville Police Department, 2002](#)).
- Direct meetings between police and managers of properties where nuisance was reported were more effective than letters from the police to the property managers ([Eck & Wartell, 1999](#)).
- Weaker quasi experiments of CPTED-type programs like store redesign, property marking, closing walkways, improving the security of doors and windows have resulted in declines of crime in the target areas relative to control ([Poyner, 1983](#); [1994](#); [Farrington et al., 1993](#); [Tilley & Webb, 1994](#); [Hope, 1994](#); [Guerette & Bowers, 2009](#)).

### Neighborhood Network Coordination/Intake & Referral (SYVPI)

CBO Program #: 48

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [II.C](#)  
 City FTE: 1.00  
 Contracts: \$513,910  
 Mechanisms: The SYVPI in general provides coordinated services and prosocial activities to deter youth from engaging in violence. The intake and referral process specifically focuses on linking youth with appropriate services  
 Theoretical Basis: Focusing on criminogenic needs; RNR (risk-need-responsivity) model; increasing social control through engagement with prosocial activities and community institutions; routine activities and supervised, structured activity.  
 Evidence Base: It is difficult to assess whether this particular component of the program has a direct crime prevention effect, because it is simply the gateway to further crime prevention services and activities. However, a strong body of evidence based on many rigorous studies shows that effective treatment and service provision should be based on the risk-needs-responsivity (RNR) model, which suggests that resources should be focused on high risk clients, criminogenic needs, and programming should be responsive to the individual's specific learning style and abilities while drawing more generally on cognitive-behavioral approaches ([Andrews et al., 1990](#); [Andrews & Bonta, 2010](#)). Intake and referral processes should involve validated risk assessment tools to accurately identify risk and criminogenic need that can be addressed through tailored services. A meta-analysis by [Olver et al. \(2009\)](#) highlights three risk assessment tools for juveniles that successfully predicted general and violent recidivism.

### Street Outreach/Critical Incident Response (SYVPI)

CBO Program #: 49  
 Category: [Community Prevention](#)  
 Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)  
 City FTE: N/A  
 Contracts: \$301,721  
 Mechanisms: This program aims to engage youth in the Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative, and respond to critical incidents to de-escalate situations and reduce retaliation  
 Theoretical Basis: Rational choice theory and deterrence: providing alternatives to violence, altering offenders' perceived risks and rewards from offending and changing perceived norms about violence.  
 Evidence Base: This program is similar to the violence interrupters and street workers in Chicago's Ceasefire intervention ([Skogan et al., 2009](#)), which was evaluated in a 7-site quasi-experimental evaluation. In four sites, Ceasefire was associated with statistically significant declines in actual and attempted shootings ranging from 16-28%. Hot spots also appeared cooler in 2 other sites, although it was not clear whether this was a program impact. However, similar programs in other sites have shown mixed results. The Pittsburgh One Vision One Life program ([Wilson et al., 2010](#)), which was a 6-point plan to stop shootings involving mediation, conflict intervention, community coalitions and rapid response, had implementation problems and resulted in increased homicide in one of three areas and increased aggravated and gun assaults in all areas. It is not known if these interventions are likely to have a longer-term positive impact, as evaluations have focused on short-term outcomes. Similar programs in Boston ([Braga et al., 2001](#)) and several other cities have shown better effects. Recently, preliminary findings from Baltimore's Safe Streets initiative ([Webster et al., 2009](#)) showed reduced homicide and shootings, but shootings fell more in the comparison sites. Newark's Operation Ceasefire ([Boyle et al., 2010](#)) showed no significant reductions in gunshot wounds or changes in rates in comparison areas. See also [Papachristos, 2011](#).

### Proactive Gang Unit Program

CBO Program #: 54  
 Category: [Community Prevention](#)  
 Evidence Rating: [IV](#)  
 City FTE: 7.00  
 Contracts: N/A  
 Mechanisms: Officer presence around schools and other areas where youth congregate will keep gang members from offending and will hold them accountable.  
 Theoretical Basis: Deterrence: presence of police officers increases accountability of gang members and discourages offending.



**Evidence Base:** A forthcoming [Campbell Systematic Review](#) highlights moderately rigorous quasi-experimental evidence showing that efforts by the gang unit to hold gang members accountable in a focused deterrence framework (e.g. a “pulling levers” program) can be effective in reducing gang-related violence (see also [Braga & Weisburd, 2011](#); [Braga, 2008](#); [Braga et al., 2008](#)). However, this program is more analogous to the evidence on police officers in schools (see [School Emphasis Officers](#) above), which suggests that increased police presence in and around schools can increase reporting and detection of crime and may result in the escalation of minor incidents into the juvenile justice system. The research described above indicates that such escalation could have a backfire effect on future delinquency.

### Crime Prevention Coordinators Program

CBO Program #: 55

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)

City FTE: 4.00

Contracts: N/A

**Mechanisms:** Police attend community meetings to provide crime prevention information and organization of neighborhood watches to increase informal social control and surveillance.

**Theoretical Basis:** Routine activities theory highlights the importance of increasing guardianship to break the connection between potential offenders and targets. Social disorganization theory suggests that crime can occur when there is a lack of cohesion among residents of a neighborhood. Conversely, collective efficacy, which indicates social cohesion and the community’s willingness to work together for the common good, offers protection against crime and disorder.

**Evidence Base:** Evidence on neighborhood watch is mixed and based on moderately rigorous studies. The [Maryland Report](#) suggests it is ineffective but a [Campbell Systematic Review](#) ([Bennett et al., 2008](#)) finds a small but overall positive effect of neighborhood watch in 15 of the 18 studies reviewed (see also [Bennett, 1990](#)). [Wyckoff & Skogan \(1993\)](#) found no decrease in victimization after increasing community meetings in Madison. [Skogan et al. \(1995\)](#) found some positive impact of community meetings in Chicago, but it was difficult to disentangle this impact from other elements of the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy.

### Community Police Team Officers Program

CBO Program #: 56

Category: [Community Prevention](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)

City FTE: 21.00

Contracts: N/A

**Mechanisms:** Problem solving efforts designed to address the underlying conditions leading to chronic problems in the community; forming partnerships with the community to reduce crime and increase legitimacy and trust in the police.

**Theoretical Basis:** For problem solving, the theoretical approach can vary based on the specific problem being addressed. Routine activities theory is often relevant to identifying problems and their solutions. Community collaboration reflects the notion of collective efficacy, which indicates social cohesion and the community’s willingness to work together for the common good and can be protective against crime and disorder.

**Evidence Base:** A [Campbell Systematic Review](#) ([Weisburd et al., 2008b](#)) reports rigorous evidence that problem-oriented policing specifically using the SARA (Scanning-Analysis-Response-Assessment) model of problem solving can have a significant impact on crime (see also [Braga et al., 1999](#); [Weisburd & Green, 1995](#); [Mazerolle et al., 2000](#)). A forthcoming Campbell Systematic Review of community-oriented policing<sup>5</sup> that specifically focuses on police-community collaboration does not show strong evidence of a crime control effect from these programs, but it is difficult to draw conclusions from this body of research because such a variation of practices and strategies fall under the definition of community policing. Often multiple strategies are included in the same program so it is impossible to tell which, if any, result in crime prevention (see also [Tuffin et al., 2006](#); [Koper et al., 2010](#); [McElroy et al., 1990](#)).

<sup>5</sup> Not currently available online; contact the author of this report for details.

## Labor Markets

### STEP - Student Teen Employment Preparation

CBO Program #: 22

Category: [Labor Markets](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)

City FTE: 1.7

Contracts: \$11,000

Mechanisms: The program aims to provide legitimate opportunities and gainful employment, skill building

Theoretical Basis: Strain and economic theories suggest that a lack of opportunity to participate in legitimate social institutions, i.e. the work force, can increase the risk of delinquency. Attachment to conventional goals and social institutions improves social control.

Evidence Base: The [Maryland Report](#) and [OJJDP Model Programs Guide](#) state that there are few rigorous evaluations of summer or other short-term subsidized career development programs. Subsidized programs show promise in improving employment prospects during the subsidy period, but effects are weak in the long term. Although a few randomized controlled trials of employment programs in general exist, much of the research is weak and does not control for the level of need of participants – programs usually work best for highest need youth. Implementation is often an issue in employment research, and direct effects on crime prevention and long term job prospect outcomes are difficult to measure. In general, highly structured, even residential programs with intensive work experience and a multi-agency approach work best for job training ([Sherman et al., 2006](#)).

### Lifeguard Training Team Program

CBO Program #: 23

Category: [Labor Markets](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)

City FTE: 0.33

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: This program provides an opportunity to train as a lifeguard and receive a job skill.

Theoretical Basis: Strain and economic theories suggest that a lack of opportunity to participate in legitimate social institutions, i.e. the work force, can increase the risk of delinquency. Attachment to conventional goals and social institutions improves social control.

Evidence Base: The [Maryland Report](#) and [OJJDP Model Programs Guide](#) state that there are few rigorous evaluations of summer or other short-term subsidized career development programs. Much of the research is weak and not well-controlled. For summer programs, positive outcomes can be cut off once school restarts and there is little effect on the likelihood of employment after school. Since there is little evidence of long-term effectiveness with vocational programs, this program may have limited effectiveness because it provides a skill for a seasonal, temporary job, although there is no evidence on this specifically. However, providing life-saving skills, especially in a prosocial environment, may also meet the goals of leadership and youth development programs, which strong evidence shows have been shown to be effective in reducing delinquency according to the [OJJDP Model Programs Guide](#).

### Youth Employment Services (SYVPI)

CBO Program #: 27

Category: [Labor Markets](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)

City FTE: N/A

Contracts: \$549,520

Mechanisms: This program focuses on subsidized employment, internships, and job skills building.

Theoretical Basis: Strain and economic theories suggest that a lack of opportunity to participate in legitimate social institutions, i.e. the work force, can increase the risk of delinquency. Attachment to conventional goals and social institutions improves social control.

Evidence Base: The [Maryland Report](#) and [OJJDP Model Programs Guide](#) state that there are few rigorous evaluations of short-term subsidized career development programs. Subsidized programs show promise in improving employment prospects during the subsidy period, but effects are weak in the

long term (see evidence base for the [STEP Program](#), above). The main difficulty with evaluating employment programs is measuring crime prevention effects directly. Improved employment prospects may be more indirectly related to crime control.

### Neighborhood Matching Fund Sustainment Program (SYVPI); Community Matching Grants (SYVPI)

CBO Program #: 28, 30

Category: [Labor Markets](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.D](#)

City FTE: N/A

Contracts: \$77,325 (Neighborhood Matching Fund); \$130,925 (Community Matching Grants); total \$208,250

Mechanisms: These programs are not directly related to crime prevention, but they provide funding to prevention programs.

Theoretical Basis: The theoretical basis for effectiveness depends on which programs are funded. There is no crime prevention theory related to the grants themselves.

Evidence Base: The [Maryland Report](#) and its update ([Sherman et al., 2006](#)) state that there are no specific evaluations of "supply side" or grant programs. The programs may be analogous to the Community Development Block Grants program, which aimed to revitalize distressed areas through direct funding to local governments to target specific problems and risk factors. Anecdotally, these grants tended to perform better than non-geographically targeted funding programs, such as small business development grants. It seems a mix of incomes and a healthy commercial district in the grant area may drive success. [Sherman et al. \(2006\)](#) note that "Implementing intensive programs in highly disadvantaged areas can be a very difficult process..." In general, programs that provide prosocial, supervised activities, specific targeting of risk factors and risk levels, and strong implementation and sustainability may be good candidates for funding.

### Summer Youth Employment (SPD Youth Outreach)

CBO Program #: 32

Category: [Labor Markets](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)

City FTE: 0.40 (portion of 2 full-time police officers dedicated to the Youth Outreach program (#32-36).

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: Provides summer employment with the police, such as helping to plan and run events and crime prevention programs.

Theoretical Basis: Promoting prosocial bonding with social institutions within the community increases positive social control and may protect against delinquency. Routine activities theory is connected to the idea that opportunities for offending will be reduced if young people are not engaged in unsupervised socializing on the streets. Theories of legitimacy suggest that people are more likely to obey the law if they trust the police and feel the police treat them with respect and fairness.

Evidence Base: Evidence base is in line with the [STEP program](#) above for employment and skills training, and [Power of Place](#) for leadership and youth development programs. Thus, aspects of this program are promising but there is not strong evidence for the effectiveness of primarily employment/job skills-based programs. However, interaction with the police may also enhance legitimacy. A [forthcoming Campbell review](#) examines the impact of police programs to increase legitimacy that used elements of procedural justice (participation, neutrality, dignity/respect, and trustworthy motives). The programs studied are not similar to the activities here, but the review suggests that increasing legitimacy can enhance trust of police and cooperation with law, so it may indirectly reduce crime and disorder.

### Police Explorers (SPD Youth Outreach)

CBO Program #: 34

Category: [Labor Markets](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.C](#)

City FTE: 0.40 (portion of 2 full-time police officers dedicated to the Youth Outreach program (#32-36).

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: This program provides work shadowing and training to foster interest in a law enforcement career.

- Theoretical Basis:** Promoting prosocial bonding with social institutions within the community increases positive social control and may protect against delinquency. Routine activities theory is connected to the idea that opportunities for offending will be reduced if young people are not engaged in unsupervised socializing on the streets. Theories of legitimacy suggest that people are more likely to obey the law if they trust the police and feel the police treat them with respect and fairness.
- Evidence Base:** This program primarily focuses on job shadowing for a specific career with the police, but it also embodies elements of leadership and youth development. The [Maryland Report](#) and its update ([Sherman et al., 2006](#)) suggests that short-term job shadowing programs are generally less effective than structured, intensive job programs, perhaps because they lack the intensity needed to overcome serious educational disadvantages. However this program could be more promising, because it is targeted toward a specific career and embodies the principles of leadership and development (see [Power of Place](#)) as well as fostering police legitimacy (see [SPD Summer Youth Employment](#)).

## Places

### Drug Market Initiative

- CBO Program #:** 9
- Category:** [Places](#)
- Evidence Rating:** [II.B](#)
- City FTE:** 0.10
- Contracts:** \$26,000
- Mechanisms:** DMI programs focus on attacking drug areas intensively with a wide variety of interventions.
- Theoretical Basis:** Some DMI programs focus on deterrence and the threat of sanction to drug dealers. Others offer treatment and services, but the threat of sanction is a key part of these strategies, building on “pulling levers” approaches.
- Evidence Base:** Pulling levers approaches show some promise for violent offenders. For DMI programs specifically, work by [Corsaro and McGarrell \(2009\)](#) and a [forthcoming Campbell Systematic Review](#) (see also [Braga & Weisburd, 2011](#)) indicate that programs can lead to a significant reduction in crime. However, studies generally do not include equivalent comparison groups. However, the [Evidence-Based Policing Matrix](#) indicates that more proactive, multi-agency problem solving approaches do show more promise than individual-based approaches. Some DMI strategies can be very individualistic, and case-management oriented.

### Vacant Buildings

- CBO Program #:** 40
- Category:** [Places](#)
- Evidence Rating:** [III.A](#)
- City FTE:** 1.8
- Contracts:** N/A
- Mechanisms:** Securing vacant buildings deters unauthorized entry by persons engaging in criminal or drug activity.
- Theoretical Basis:** Routine activities and opportunity theory: reducing suitable targets, increasing guardianship by removing opportunity to offend away from public view.
- Evidence Base:** Weaker descriptive research indicates that illegal uses were found in 83% of unsecured vacant buildings, compared to only 34% of secured vacant buildings. Blocks with unsecured buildings have 3 times as many calls for service to law enforcement for drugs, almost 2 times as many calls for service for theft, and 2 times as many calls for service for violence. Securing vacant buildings, as one part of a much larger program, reduced crime in one neighborhood in Baltimore ([Spelman, 1993](#); [Kelling & Coles, 1996](#)). Vacant buildings can also have a negative financial impact on the surrounding homes ([Immergluck and Smith, 2006](#)) and local authorities: foreclosed vacant properties left secured cost localities about \$430, while those left unsecured can cost localities between \$5,000 and \$35,000 ([Apgar et al. 2005](#)). The [Maryland Report](#) and its update ([Sherman et al., 2006](#)) also suggests that restricting pedestrian access in general may be beneficial to crime control, although the evidence-base is of low quality.

### Vegetation Overgrowth Enforcement

CBO Program #: 41

Category: [Places](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.D](#)

City FTE: 1.00

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: Enforcing local codes to address overgrowth around property, to reduce appearance of disorder.

Theoretical Basis: Broken windows theory suggests that the appearance of disorder in a location, such as broken windows, vegetation overgrowth, litter and graffiti is an attractor of further and increased disorder and crime. Situational crime prevention is concerned with efforts to change the physical environment to make crime less appealing and increase perceptions of safety.

Evidence Base: There is no specific research on the use of vegetation overgrowth enforcement to prevent crime, although the concept is promising from a theoretical perspective. Implementation is the key to the success of this program. Sending letters to residents asking them to address the overgrowth is unlikely to be effective without follow-up and consequences for non-compliance. However, the [Maryland Report](#) and its update ([Sherman et al., 2006](#)) note that evidence for the effectiveness of *police-led* crackdowns on disorder shows no consistent effects and based only on moderately rigorous research designs.

### Junk Storage Enforcement; Illegal Dumping – Hotline; Illegal Dumping - SPU

CBO Program #: 42, 62, 63

Category: [Places](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.D](#)

City FTE: 2.00 (Junk storage); 0.3 (Hotline); 3.00 (Illegal dumping); total 5.3

Contracts: \$284,250 (Illegal dumping)

Mechanisms: Reducing the appearance of disorder and engaging the community by providing systems to report problems.

Theoretical Basis: Broken windows theory suggests that the appearance of disorder in a location, such as broken windows, vegetation overgrowth, litter and graffiti is an attractor of further and increased disorder and crime. Collective efficacy, which indicates social cohesion and the community's willingness to work together for the common good, may protect against increasing disorder likely to attract crime problems. Situational crime prevention is concerned with efforts to change the physical environment to make crime less appealing and increase perceptions of safety.

Evidence Base: There is no specific evidence on these mechanisms, although the wider literature on broken windows theory and reducing disorder suggests they could be promising. Again, implementation is important. Collective efficacy may not be sustained if citizen reports are not followed up and acted upon quickly. As discussed above, the [Maryland Report](#) notes that evidence for the effectiveness of *police-led* crackdowns on disorder shows no consistent effects and based only on moderately rigorous research designs.

### Graffiti Abatement - Department of Parks and Recreation

CBO Program #: 43

Category: [Places](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.C](#)

City FTE: 2.00

Contracts: \$2,500

Mechanisms: Rapid removal of graffiti (within 6 days) is intended to reduce the appearance of disorder and reduce rewards for offenders.

Theoretical Basis: Broken windows theory suggests that the appearance of disorder in a location, such as broken windows, vegetation overgrowth, litter and graffiti is an attractor of further and increased disorder and crime. Routine activities and rational choice theories focus on rewards and motivations for offenders. Offenders may perceive lower reward from engaging in graffiti compared to the risk of sanction if the graffiti is swiftly removed. Situational crime prevention is concerned with efforts to change the physical environment to make crime less appealing and increase perceptions of safety.

Evidence Base: The evidence on rapid removal is of low to moderate quality, and has primarily been focused more specifically on transit systems ([Maryland Report](#); [Sherman et al., 2006](#)). A further problem with research in this area is that rapid removal (which is defined as within 2 hours up to one day) is often one of many interventions deployed at a location, and studies cannot show which individual

strategies were most effective. However, the Maryland Report indicates that rapid removal of graffiti on subway cars resulted in decreased graffiti incidents, and when combined with other interventions, decreases in other types of crime have been reported. Numerous studies find a correlation between physical disorder (defined generally as graffiti, litter, abandoned buildings) and fear of crime. See also [Skogan \(1990\)](#); [Kelling & Coles \(1996\)](#); [Taylor \(1985\)](#); [Perkins et al \(1992\)](#); [Sloan-Howitt & Kelling \(1990\)](#); [Carr & Spring \(1993\)](#); [Felson et al. \(1996\)](#).

### Only in Seattle Initiative

CBO Program #: 45

Category: [Places](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)

City FTE: 1.00

Contracts: \$800,000

Mechanisms: This initiative involves a number of situational crime prevention strategies including hiring off-duty police officers for surveillance, closing problematic bars; block watches, "national night out," public safety forums, and community design changes such as street lighting and other security improvements

Theoretical Basis: Routine activities and opportunity theories focus on the nexus between motivated offenders, suitable targets and a lack of capable guardianship, aiming to remove at least one factor from the equation to prevent crime. Situational crime prevention is concerned with efforts to change the physical environment to make crime less appealing and increase perceptions of safety. Collective efficacy, which indicates social cohesion and the community's willingness to work together for the common good, offers protection against crime and disorder.

Evidence Base: Weak pre/post studies indicate that the presence of off-duty police officers at problem places (such as bars) may reduce loitering, drug dealing and problem behavior. However, effects did not persist after the intervention. Studies of other types of uniformed guards in banks, retail stores, parking lots and other high crime areas show a range of positive effects on crime and safety, depending on what guards were doing and their ability to observe the space. Block watch programs and safety forums are associated with reductions in burglary, but participation is greater in more affluent communities (e.g., [Hannan, 1982](#); [Kenney, 1986](#); [Lindsay & McGillis, 1986](#); [Pate et al., 1987](#); [Harris & O'Connell, 1994](#); [Popkin et al., 1995a](#); [1995b](#); [Mazerolle et al., 2000](#); [Cohen et al., 2003](#)).

Civil remedies, including closing problematic bars, resulted in declines in violence in Australia. However, compliance with the code of practice ceased after the intervention and the violence returned. There are problems in the evaluation of these programs because the interventions often include multiple strategies that cannot be separated in the analysis ([Hommel et al., 1997](#); [2004](#)).

Weaker evidence suggests that CPTED interventions such as store redesign, property marking, closing walkways, improving the security of doors and windows have resulted in declines of crime in the target areas relative to control ([Poyner, 1991](#); [1994](#); [Farrington et al., 1993](#); [Tilley & Webb, 1994](#)).

### Business Improvement Area Support Program

CBO Program #: 46

Category: [Places](#)

Evidence Rating: [II.B](#)

City FTE: 0.3

Contracts: \$35,000

Mechanisms: Reduction of "broken windows" or signals that criminal activity is acceptable through litter and graffiti clean-up; increased guardianship from hired private security and off-duty police officers.

Theoretical Basis: Routine activities theory focuses on increased guardianship to break the convergence between offenders and victims or targets. Broken windows theory suggests that the appearance of disorder in a location, such as broken windows, vegetation overgrowth, litter and graffiti is an attractor of further and increased disorder and crime. Situational crime prevention is concerned with efforts to change the physical environment to make crime less appealing and increase perceptions of safety.

Evidence Base: Moderately rigorous quasi-experiments show promising results for Business Improvement Areas (BIAs). [Hoyt \(2005\)](#) found that BIAs in Philadelphia were associated with lower property crime and theft rates than non-BIA commercial areas, with no evidence of displacement. [Brooks \(2008\)](#) found that BIAs in Los Angeles compared to areas that considered a BIA but did not adopt one had total



crime reductions of 6 to 10%, especially for serious crime. [MacDonald et al. \(2010\)](#) found that BIAs in Los Angeles had, on average, a 12% decrease in robbery and an 8% decrease in violent crime, although there was some variation across the 30 areas studied. Furthermore, [Cook and MacDonald \(2011\)](#) find that the social benefits of BIAs far exceed the costs, and displacement of crime outside the BIA is minimal. It is important to note, however, that BIAs vary widely in their activities, with some focusing more on commercial development than crime prevention, so it is not always possible to generalize from the research.

### Code Compliance Team, Seattle Nightlife Initiative

CBO Program #: 47

Category: [Places](#)

Evidence Rating: [I](#)

City FTE: 1.25

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: Community and other stakeholder engagement program intended to reduce antisocial behavior, noise, public disturbances, and other nuisance behavior.

Theoretical Basis: Broken windows theory suggests that the appearance of disorder in a location, such as broken windows, vegetation overgrowth, litter and graffiti is an attractor of further and increased disorder and crime. Nuisance behavior may attract similar behavior and reduce legitimate use of a space by capable guardians (routine activities theory). Situational crime prevention is concerned with efforts to change the physical environment to make crime less appealing and increase perceptions of safety.

Evidence Base: The [Maryland Report](#) and its update ([Sherman et al., 2006](#)) highlight a number of high quality evaluations, including randomized trials, which find positive effects for nuisance abatement programs. The research indicates declines in various crime types and misdemeanors relative to comparison sites, with no backfire effects. Studies of nuisance abatement programs include [Eck and Wartell \(1999\)](#); Green ([1993](#); [1995](#); [1996](#)); [Mazerolle et al. \(1998\)](#).

### Graffiti Abatement - Department of Transportation

CBO Program #: 50

Category: [Places](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.A](#)

City FTE: 2.00

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: Rapid removal of graffiti (within 6 days) is intended to reduce the appearance of disorder and reduce rewards for offenders.

Theoretical Basis: Broken windows theory suggests that the appearance of disorder in a location, such as broken windows, vegetation overgrowth, litter and graffiti is an attractor of further and increased disorder and crime. Routine activities and rational choice theories focus on rewards and motivations for offenders. Offenders may perceive lower reward from engaging in graffiti compared to the risk of sanction if the graffiti is swiftly removed.

Evidence Base: See evidence for [other graffiti abatement programs](#), above. Evidence is more direct in this case because prior research has been conducted primarily on transit systems. However, Seattle's program appears to focus mainly on graffiti removal from street signs and parking areas, which is less analogous to mass transit.

### Pedestrian Lighting

CBO Program #: 51

Category: [Places](#)

Evidence Rating: [II.B](#)

City FTE: 1.00

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: Street lighting is designed to increase visibility in areas where crime is likely to occur.

Theoretical Basis: Situational crime prevention is concerned with efforts to change the physical environment to make crime less appealing and increase perceptions of safety. Routine activities theory suggests that increased guardianship (which is provided by other people in an area or the lighting itself) can break the nexus between a motivated offender and suitable target.

**Evidence Base:** A [Campbell Systematic Review](#) by [Welsh and Farrington \(2008\)](#) describes moderately rigorous quasi-experiments, usually involving a non-equivalent control group (see also [Painter and Farrington, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2001](#)). The majority of the studies have been carried out in the United Kingdom in residential areas. The studies show crime reductions in the treatment areas, and a diffusion of crime control benefits to neighboring areas.

### Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)

**CBO Program #:** 53

**Category:** [Places](#)

**Evidence Rating:** [III.A](#)

**City FTE:** 1.00

**Contracts:** N/A

**Mechanisms:** Changes to the structure and characteristics of the built environment aim to reduce opportunities for crime and conflict and increase perceptions of safety. Specific CPTED techniques are not described in the report on Seattle's program.

**Theoretical Basis:** Environmental and ecological theories of crime and situational crime prevention are concerned with efforts to change the physical environment to make crime less appealing and increase perceptions of safety. Routine activities theory relates to how offenders, targets and guardians interact within physical spaces.

**Evidence Base:** The [Maryland Report](#) and its update ([Sherman et al., 2006](#)) describe a wide range of interventions can be classed as CPTED, including store redesign, property marking, closing walkways and improving the security of doors and windows. The quality of evidence is generally low, with non-equivalent control groups or pre/post designs without a control group; however, many studies result in crime declines in target areas. No evaluation has looked at the direct relationship between CPTED training for police officers and subsequent crime reduction. Study references include [Farrington et al. \(1993\)](#); [Poyner \(1994\)](#); [Tilley & Webb \(1994\)](#).

### Graffiti Hotline

**CBO Program #:** 57

**Category:** [Places](#)

**Evidence Rating:** [III.C](#)

**City FTE:** 0.9

**Contracts:** N/A

**Mechanisms:** Rapid removal of graffiti facilitated by increased guardianship and community involvement.

**Theoretical Basis:** Broken windows theory suggests that the appearance of disorder in a location, such as broken windows, vegetation overgrowth, litter and graffiti is an attractor of further and increased disorder and crime. Collective efficacy, which indicates social cohesion and the community's willingness to work together for the common good, may protect against increasing disorder likely to attract crime problems. Situational crime prevention is concerned with efforts to change the physical environment to make crime less appealing and increase perceptions of safety.

**Evidence Base:** See evidence above for other [graffiti removal programs](#). Implementation is crucial to the success of this program. Crime prevention and collective efficacy will only be sustained if citizen complaints are promptly dealt with and the response is visible.

### Graffiti Rangers

**CBO Program #:** 58

**Category:** [Places](#)

**Evidence Rating:** [III.C](#)

**City FTE:** 6:00

**Contracts:** N/A

**Mechanisms:** Rapid removal of graffiti (within 6 days) is intended to reduce the appearance of disorder and reduce rewards for offenders.

**Theoretical Basis:** Broken windows theory suggests that the appearance of disorder in a location, such as broken windows, vegetation overgrowth, litter and graffiti is an attractor of further and increased disorder and crime. Routine activities and rational choice theories focus on rewards and motivations for offenders. Offenders may perceive lower reward from engaging in graffiti compared to the risk of sanction if the graffiti is swiftly removed and visibility of rangers contributes to increased



guardianship. Situational crime prevention is concerned with efforts to change the physical environment to make crime less appealing and increase perceptions of safety.

Evidence Base: See evidence above for other [graffiti removal programs](#). Again, implementation is crucial to success. The rapid response must be truly rapid to send a message that repeat offending is not worthwhile.

### Code Enforcement

CBO Program #: 59

Category: [Places](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.C](#)

City FTE: 1.00

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: Enforcing graffiti removal in privately owned locations (within 10 days) to reduce the reward to offenders and reduce the appearance of disorder.

Theoretical Basis: Broken windows theory suggests that the appearance of disorder in a location, such as broken windows, vegetation overgrowth, litter and graffiti is an attractor of further and increased disorder and crime. Situational crime prevention is concerned with efforts to change the physical environment to make crime less appealing and increase perceptions of safety. The focus on privately owned locations brings in community involvement, which is underpinned by social cohesion and collective efficacy.

Evidence Base: See evidence above for other [graffiti removal programs](#) and [importance of implementation](#).

### Outreach/Education and Volunteer Coordination

CBO Program #: 60

Category: [Places](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.D](#)

City FTE: 1.00

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: Rapid removal of graffiti and increased community involvement and awareness. Upon owner's request, volunteers remove graffiti from private and public property.

Theoretical Basis: Broken windows theory suggests that the appearance of disorder in a location, such as broken windows, vegetation overgrowth, litter and graffiti is an attractor of further and increased disorder and crime. Collective efficacy, which indicates social cohesion and the community's willingness to work together for the common good, may protect against increasing disorder likely to attract crime problems. Situational crime prevention is concerned with efforts to change the physical environment to make crime less appealing and increase perceptions of safety.

Evidence Base: See evidence above for other [graffiti removal programs](#). Effectiveness would depend on how well this program is implemented. Rapid response is crucial, so volunteers must be mobilized quickly to make repeat offending less desirable. Program must be strongly underpinned by social cohesion to sustain community interest in learning about the program and volunteering, as well as making property owners aware that they can call.

### Business Improvement Area (BIA) Grant Program

CBO Program #: 61

Category: [Places](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.C](#)

City FTE: N/A

Contracts: \$57,000

Mechanisms: Offers grants to BIAs to supplement existing contracts for graffiti and litter removal.

Theoretical Basis: Broken windows theory suggests that the appearance of disorder in a location, such as broken windows, vegetation overgrowth, litter and graffiti is an attractor of further and increased disorder and crime. Collective efficacy, which indicates social cohesion and the community's willingness to work together for the common good, may protect against increasing disorder likely to attract crime problems. Situational crime prevention is concerned with efforts to change the physical environment to make crime less appealing and increase perceptions of safety.

Evidence Base: See evidence above for other [graffiti removal programs](#). This is a grant program rather than active prevention; however, if the services funded in line with the evidence base on rapid removal

of graffiti and other signs of disorder, the program is likely to be effective (although existing evidence is of low quality).

### Park Rangers

CBO Program #: 64

Category: [Places](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)

City FTE: 6.00

Contracts: N/A

Mechanisms: Park rangers serve as place managers, providing increased guardianship through their ability to address anti-social behavior by enforcing park code violations.

Theoretical Basis: Routine activities theory – increasing guardianship to prevent the convergence of offenders and targets.

Evidence Base: No studies could be located on the specific effect of park rangers. Weaker studies have examined the effectiveness of guards or security officers in settings like banks and airports and tend to show a wide range of effects. The [Maryland Report](#) indicates no evidence for the effectiveness of guards, except at airports, where they were assessed as promising. A review by [Welsh, Mudge, and Farrington \(2009\)](#) describes security guards in parking lots as a promising strategy but notes that the effectiveness of other place managers remains unknown due to the small number of weak studies.

Anecdotal reports suggest that people like having rangers around, but it is not clear if this translates into additional crime or non-crime related benefits. The increased guardianship rangers provide fits in well with notions of routine activities theory, but it's not clear if the number of park rangers is a sufficient level of guardianship for the 10 parks for which they are responsible. The 2010 Seattle evaluation (cited in the CBO report) reported a 71% decrease in incident reports in parks patrolled by rangers, comparing 2007 to 2009. However, this study has a weak design that could be susceptible to confounding by other factors, such as the installation of CCTV in Cal Anderson Park in early 2008

## Corrections and Treatment

### Indigent Batters' Treatment

CBO Program #: 2

Category: [Corrections and Treatment](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)

City FTE: 0.05

Contracts: \$148,650

Mechanisms: Batterer intervention programs aim to prevent crime by addressing perpetrators' attitudes toward women and violence and teaching alternative anger management strategies.

Theoretical Basis: Treatment of individual behavioral problems and deterrence through supervision and court mandated services as a condition of probation.

Evidence Base: A [Campbell Systematic Review](#) ([Feder, Wilson, & Austin, 2008](#)) identified 10 rigorous randomized controlled trials or quasi-experiments that indicated a slight positive effect on official reports of recidivism. However, the programs showed no effect on victim reports of further violence. This is consistent with other literature on domestic violence that seems to indicate different results between official reports and victim reports of recidivating. Victims may be less likely to report crimes if they feel uncomfortable or in danger by doing so. The review authors warn policy makers not to be swayed by less-rigorous studies, as they can suffer from selection bias.

### Crime Prevention and Re-Entry (Co-STARs, CURB, GOTS)

CBO Program #: 6, 7, 8

Category: [Corrections and Treatment](#)

Evidence Rating: [V.A](#)

City FTE: 0.50

Contracts: \$400,000 (Co-STARs); \$247,200 (CURB); \$317,200 (GOTS); Total \$964,400.

- Mechanisms:** Co-STARS' focus is on mental health treatment, case management, and drug treatment. CURB focuses on youths "of color" who live in Rainier Beach neighborhood involved in drug, criminal or gang related activities. COTS services adults of color with criminal histories at 23rd and Union.
- Theoretical Basis:** Client driven service, case management, peer support, partnerships, and low barrier access to services for those reentering system. This approach focuses on reduced supervision and increased rehabilitation and reintegration into the community.
- Evidence Base:** The City of Seattle asked the University of Washington to develop a framework for evaluation, but the results are currently unknown. The [Maryland Report](#) and other crime prevention research indicate that programs that are vague, nondirective and unstructured do not work. More specified, cognitive behavioral and drug treatment seem more effective ([Landenberger & Lipsey, 2005](#); [Lipsey, Landenberger, and Wilson, 2007](#)). Cognitive-behavioral therapy has a positive effect on recidivism for both adult and juvenile offenders, according to rigorous randomized controlled trials and quasi-experiments.

### Aggression Replacement Training (SYVPI)

- CBO Program #:** 12
- Category:** [Corrections and Treatment](#)
- Evidence Rating:** [II.A](#)
- City FTE:** N/A
- Contracts:** \$60,000
- Mechanisms:** Training in anger management, social skills and moral reasoning to reduce risk of delinquent behavior.
- Theoretical Basis:** Differential association and differential reinforcement theory: young people learn criminal orientations through interaction with others; criminal behavior is more likely when a young person is exposed to social messages unfavorable to law rather than prosocial messages. Since all behavior is learned, new prosocial cognitions can also be learned.
- Evidence Base:** Forthcoming [Campbell Systematic Review](#) will examine the effectiveness of ART programs based on rigorous experimental and quasi-experimental evidence. [Lipsey et al. \(2007\)](#) include two studies of ART in their systematic review of rigorously-evaluated cognitive behavioral programs and found very strong effects on recidivism. Several other studies have indicated that ART is a promising, evidence-based treatment for juvenile offenders, including the first [Maryland Report](#) update ([Sherman et al., 2002](#)) and [Loeber et al. \(1998\)](#). The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's [Model Programs Guide](#) describes ART as an effective program.

### Chemical Dependence Intervention

- CBO Program #:** 14
- Category:** [Corrections and Treatment](#)
- Evidence Rating:** [II.C](#)
- City FTE:** 0.18
- Contracts:** \$119,020
- Mechanisms:** Case management with emphasis on recommending treatment and housing options will decrease chemical dependency
- Theoretical Basis:** Differential association theory suggests that criminal behavior, like all behavior is learned. Prosocial behavior can also be learned. Housing and treatment may help addicted persons to rebuild their lives away from antisocial influences.
- Evidence Base:** A [Campbell Systematic Review](#) examines similar evidence on drug treatment for incarcerated individuals ([Mitchell, Wilson, & MacKenzie, 2006](#)). The review includes 66 highly rigorous randomized controlled trials and quasi-experiments. The review finds that group counseling programs directed at substance abuse reduces reoffending but not drug use, while therapeutic community approaches show strong, consistent effects on reducing recidivism and drug dependency. Those programs that intensively address the multiple problems of substance abusers show the most promising effects. [Lipsey \(1992\)](#) also suggests that the community is the most effective setting for treatment programs.

### Methadone Voucher Program

CBO Program #: 16

Category: [Corrections and Treatment](#)

Evidence Rating: [I](#)

City FTE: N/A

Contracts: \$526,073

Mechanisms: Methadone treatment is used to reduce heroin dependency.

Theoretical Basis: Treatment and rehabilitation, and differential association theory (encouraging prosocial rather than antisocial behavior).

Evidence Base: [Crimesolutions.gov](#) includes three randomized clinical trials showing positive evidence for the effectiveness of maintenance programs. A [Campbell Systematic Review](#) by [Egli et al. \(2009\)](#) shows that in rigorous studies heroin maintenance reduces crime significantly more than methadone maintenance, but methadone maintenance reduces crime slightly more than treatment programs that do not include substitution therapy (though this finding is not significant). However, when comparing post- with pre-treatment levels of crime, methadone maintenance produces very large and significant reductions in crime during the methadone maintenance.

### Victimization Prevention

#### Battered Women's Shelters

CBO Program #: 3

Category: [Victimization](#)

Evidence Rating: [III.B](#)

City FTE: 0.1

Contracts: \$785,994

Mechanisms: Provision of housing, shelter, and services for victims of domestic violence.

Theoretical Basis: Routine activities – shelters provide capable guardianship as well as support to reduce immediate and longer-term risk of further victimization.

Evidence Base: There is no specific rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of shelters themselves. However, the key to the longer-term crime prevention effectiveness of shelters is the services and support provided to women to enable them to break the cycle of abuse. [Crimesolutions.gov](#) describes related evidence on services for women leaving shelters as “promising,” meaning that some evidence is available that show effectiveness but more research is recommended. Two programs have been evaluated using randomized controlled designs, and additional work by Sullivan uses non-randomized comparison groups. There are some positive effects for outcomes like psychological wellbeing and support, but crime prevention results are mixed, showing no significant differences between treatment and control group participants for further abuse. The effects may vary (increase or decrease) over time.

#### Prostituted Youth Residential Recovery – The Bridge; Prostituted Youth Advocacy

CBO Program #: 4, 5

Category: [Victimization](#)

Evidence Rating: [V.A](#)

City FTE: 0.5 (The Bridge)

Contracts: \$482,113 (The Bridge); \$66,177 (Advocacy); Total \$548,290

Mechanisms: Provides advocacy, case management, and shelter to young people involved in prostitution.

Theoretical Basis: Practical assistance such as treatment, rehabilitation and legal aid.

Evidence Base: No direct evidence on advocacy and other services for youth involved in prostitution. In juvenile justice program generally, individualized therapy, skill building, and behavior treatment are effective, and appear to work better than advocacy and casework ([Lipsey, Wilson, and Cothran, 2000](#)).

## Indirect

### Housing First

CBO Program #: 1

Category: [Indirect](#)

Evidence Rating: [V.B](#)

City FTE: 0.25

Contracts: \$2,332,664

Mechanisms: Provision of housing, treatment and resources to homeless to increase residential stability and support.

Theoretical Basis: Homelessness may be a risk factor for crime and victimization through routine activities (hardship may provide a motivation to offend, or vulnerable situation may lead to the homeless person becoming a suitable target for victimization).

Evidence Base: A [forthcoming Campbell systematic review](#) examines 32 rigorous randomized controlled trials and quasi-experiments of Housing First programs. [Preliminary findings](#) indicate that programs combining housing, treatment and services are better than no housing or no treatment at reducing homelessness and increasing residential stability. However, when "Housing First" models are compared with "Treatment First" models, there are contradictory effects, depending on the location of the program. The crime prevention effectiveness of Housing First has not been tested and would be difficult to measure directly.

### Emergency Services Patrol

CBO Program #: 15

Category: [Indirect](#)

Evidence Rating: [V.B](#)

City FTE: N/A

Contracts: \$542,116

Mechanisms: Provides screening and transport to inebriated individuals to service agencies, shifting resources across emergency services.

Theoretical Basis: Routine activities. Immediate intervention with inebriated individuals may reduce risk of becoming a victim or motivated offender.

Evidence Base: No evidence on effectiveness of this program for any outcomes (such as accidents, overdoses, etc.), including crime prevention. There appears to be no direct crime prevention purpose here.

### Needle Exchange

CBO Program #: 19

Category: [Indirect](#)

Evidence Rating: [V.B](#)

City FTE: N/A

Contracts: \$406,112

Mechanisms: Providing clean needles can improve public health by reducing the risk of transmitted diseases.

Theoretical Basis: This program is not specifically intended to prevent crime.

Evidence Base: The public health literature indicates that needle exchanges can reduce transmission of HIV and other diseases. A systematic review from the United Kingdom ([Jones et al., 2008](#)) shows positive findings in some studies for reducing risky behavior and disease. However, research does not measure an effect on crime, and the program is not intended to have crime prevention outcomes.

## APPENDIX C. CLASSIFICATION OF CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS

### Families/Early Intervention

#### Seattle Programs: 3

Family and early intervention programs are designed to prevent or reduce future offending by young people by changing the environmental factors children are exposed to in their early lives. Programs in this category support positive social and psychological development and teach life skills and self-control. For young people who are already at risk, family-based programs target problems in the family unit as a whole to reduce the risk factors for delinquency. Family-based programs are based on theories rooted in developmental criminology, which examines the psychological and social risk factors associated with crime and protective factors that prevent or lead to desistance from crime (e.g. [Farrington, 1998](#); [Thornberry, 1987](#); [Sampson & Laub, 1993](#)). Social control theory (e.g. [Hirschi, 1969](#)) also suggests that individuals who are strongly bonded to social institutions, such as the family, school, and prosocial peers, are less likely to become delinquent. In general, early intervention has been shown through a strong body of rigorous evidence to be one of the most successful strategies for preventing future delinquency (e.g. [Piquero et al., 2008](#)). Family-based and early prevention programs in Seattle include Nurse-Family Partnerships, Multi-systemic Therapy and life skills training, all of which are considered to have a strong evidence base.

### School-based Prevention

#### Seattle Programs: 3

Some school-based programs seek to prevent crime indirectly by providing skills training and academic support to ensure that young people stay in school, which keeps them away from unsupervised socializing and provides legitimate opportunities for success. This is based on social control theory ([Hirschi, 1969](#)), which proposes that young people who have strong, positive associations with prosocial peers and social institutions like the school will be less likely to engage in delinquency. Providing academic support so that young people stay in school and are encouraged through achievement is intended to foster these bonds. Differential association and learning theories also support the notion that young people who drop out of school may be more likely to associate with other delinquent peers and learn law-breaking behavior ([Sutherland, 1947](#); [Burgess & Akers, 1968](#); [Matsueda, 1988](#)).

School-based prevention can also be more direct, through the placement of police officers in schools to handle truancy and discipline issues. Seattle's school-based programs are mostly this second type of program. School police officers, in theory, serve a deterrence and surveillance role, providing guardianship, reinforcing compliance with rules and reducing the attractiveness of offending. Swiftness of sanctioning is a key part of deterrence theory, so the presence of officers on the school site itself is supposed to lend credibility to the threat of immediate sanctions for problem behavior (e.g. [Nagin, 1998](#)). However, these theories are not supported by research evidence. Police presence and surveillance in schools is sometimes associated with an increase in offending, perhaps because offending is more easily detectable. When minor disciplinary issues are escalated to the juvenile justice system there may be negative future consequences for youth. Research suggests that young people who are formally processed are more likely to continue offending than those who are dealt with outside the justice system ([Petrosino et al., 2010](#)).

## Community-Based Prevention

### Seattle Programs: 18

Community-based crime prevention embraces a number of strategies emphasizing civic engagement, personal development and mentorship to keep young people off the streets and engaged in prosocial activities, promote legitimacy and trust in the police, and enhancing positive social bonds with community institutions. Community-based crime prevention also encompasses citizen mobilization in response to crime and disorder issues, such as neighborhood watch, police-community meetings, and reporting and clean-up of signs of disorder such as graffiti and litter. Community-based programs designed to engage at-risk youth are generally rooted in theories of social control, differential association, and routine activities, as described above, while mobilization programs reflect the idea of collective efficacy, which proposes that neighborhoods in which there is high social cohesion and a shared desire by residents to work for a common good will have lower rates of disorder and crime ([Sampson, 1995](#); [Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997](#)). Theories of legitimacy suggest that when citizens trust the police and feel the police treat them with respect, dignity, and fairness, citizens will be more likely to comply with the law (e.g. [Tyler, 1990](#)). Routine activities theories also underpin many community-based programs that try to break the links that cause offenders and targets/victims to converge in space and time (e.g. [Cohen & Felson, 1979](#)).

The evidence of effectiveness for community-based strategies is best assessed by referring to individual programs in the Appendix, because of the wide range of programs and strategies involved. However, much of the research on community-based programs is limited because of difficulties in disentangling the effects of various approaches, but there is a general consensus that community prevention is a promising approach. In addition, programs that help at-risk or adjudicated individuals within the community, especially juveniles, are more effective than those offered in secure settings (e.g. [Lipsey, 1992](#)).

## Labor Markets

### Seattle Programs: 7

Programming in “labor markets” ([Sherman et al., 2006](#)) aims to prevent crime indirectly by offering job opportunities and skills training, especially for at-risk young people, to both keep them off the streets and provide legitimate opportunities for the future. “Supply side” programs, such as grant programs that provide economic assistance for services in disadvantaged areas or populations, also fall within this category. General strain theory is often cited as the theoretical basis for prevention through employment and training (e.g. [Agnew, 1992](#)). It proposes that negative emotions lead to offending, and these emotions are caused when people are prevented from achieving a valued goal (among other causes). Employment and financial security are “valued goals” of conventional society, so individuals who feel they are prevented from accessing these social goals through a lack of opportunity or skill may develop negative emotions and offending will result. Routine activities theory also applies: employment and training provide prosocial, structured activities that keep youth away from unsupervised socializing.

The evidence base for employment programs is somewhat weak (e.g. [Sherman et al., 2006](#)). One difficulty is that crime prevention is not a direct outcome of these programs, so it is hard to measure. Many job training programs are also short-term, and do not provide sufficient dosage or intensity to overcome the hardships that create the need for training and support. Particularly for youth, programs may not guarantee employment or provide sustained support up to the point at which they are old enough to enter the workforce. Thus, while Seattle does not provide any



employment programs that have harmful effects, there is very little existing evidence to suggest that these programs have promise beyond the short-term.

## Places

### Seattle Programs: 19

Preventing crime at places is a key element of crime prevention. While many traditional prevention programs target personal or social risk factors, place-based prevention recognizes that targeting attractors of crime in specific small areas, such as visible disorder (graffiti, trash), street disorder; “designing out” crime through techniques of architectural, environmental and open space design to reduce the likelihood of conflict or the convergence of offenders and targets, is an economical way to tackle crime problems. Places, unlike people, do not move, so police and other prevention services can easily find them, and since crime is highly concentrated at small places, resources can be focused on these areas instead of a larger, disparate group of individuals ([Weisburd et al., 1992](#); [Sherman, 1995](#); [Weisburd et al., 2004](#); [Weisburd, 2008](#)). Routine activities/opportunity theory (e.g. [Cohen & Felson, 1979](#)) proposes that crime occurs when a motivated offender converges with a suitable target in the absence of capable guardianship. Place-based prevention seeks to remove one or more of these factors from the equation, usually by removing targets or increasing guardianship. Environmental and ecological criminology, situational crime prevention and rational choice theory are also related to place-based prevention. Guardianship and environmental change can be used to block opportunities, remove signs of disorder, increase offenders’ perceived risk of engaging in crime or reduce the likely reward.

There is a great deal of evidence in support of the theoretical basis for place-based prevention, although some of the evaluations on non-law enforcement techniques are weak designs. This is mainly due to the difficulties of studying environmental change with suitable control groups or in the absence of other factors. Nonetheless, there are a large number of promising programs within this group. The policing literature suggests that place-based approaches work best when they are targeted to very specific problems and risk factors, and engage multiple service agencies ([Lum, Koper, & Telep, 2011](#)). In general, many of Seattle’s place-based prevention programs are effective or promising, and many of those that lack evidence but are promising from a theoretical perspective are place-based.

## Corrections and Treatment

### Seattle Programs: 7

Corrections and treatment programs target risk factors for offending or recidivism and provide behavioral treatment for individuals already involved in crimes such as domestic violence, or crime-related issues like substance abuse. There are numerous theoretical bases for treatment and corrections program, depending on the nature of the problem being addressed and the person’s history and exposure to risk factors. Developmental criminology, social control, self-control and differential association, discussed above, may all be relevant. There is also a strong theoretical literature on the principles of effective intervention for individual treatment. Successful programs are closely tailored to the risk and need levels of participants and are responsive to their learning styles and programming needs (e.g. [Andrews et al., 1990](#)), and are grounded in cognitive-behavioral approaches. [Lipsey \(1992\)](#) also notes that the most effective correctional programs are of greater intensity and duration than less successful ones, involve skill building and multi-modal approaches, and occur in community settings rather than secure institutions. Seattle uses several evidence-based correctional programs, including cognitive-behavioral therapy.

## Victimization Prevention

### Seattle Programs: 3

Victimization prevention does not appear as a separate category in the Maryland Report, but we included it to highlight the different mechanisms involved in crime prevention programs that aim to reduce the risk of victimization rather than offending. Victimization programs provide shelter, service, and treatment for victims of crime, such as those who have suffered domestic violence, and vulnerable, victimized populations like child prostitutes. Services consist of immediate responses to remove the individual from a dangerous situation, and longer-term services to provide rehabilitation and prevent further victimization. Many of the theories of crime also apply to crime victims; for example, routine activities theory explains the role of victims (“suitable targets”) in the crime equation. Treatment and services like cognitive-behavioral approaches and skill-building also help chronic victims of crime to reduce their vulnerability and rebuild a safe living environment. Research on the effectiveness of victimization prevention programs are limited, in part because there is traditionally a greater focus on tackling offenders, and also because few evaluations produce positive effects. Ironically, victimization prevention programs can improve victims’ trust in the legal system, which encourages them to report problems more often. Thus, many programs appear ineffective because calls for service may increase as a result (e.g. [Feder et al., 2008](#); [Davis et al., 2008](#)).

## Indirect

### Seattle Programs: 3

Three of Seattle’s crime prevention programs are not sufficiently related to crime prevention to be able to draw conclusions about the evidence (there is no evidence of crime prevention effects of these programs). Of the three, Housing First is one with most connection to indirect crime prevention outcomes. Through receiving housing and services, the risk of being on the street is reduced – being on the street could be a risk factor for both crime and victimization, as well as indirectly through substance abuse and lack of work, and associated with differential association, lack of social control, routine activities theories etc. Needle exchange programs and diversion of alcohol and drug issues to emergency services could also be related to routine activities (reducing risk of victimization especially); however, there are no primary or secondary crime prevention outcomes of these programs. Seattle spends more money on contracts for these three programs (\$3.3m, or 28% of all crime prevention contract funding) than in any of the other crime prevention categories.

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